• 2011-12-07

    1 - [转载]

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  • 2011-07-19

    China's economy - [转载]

    THERE has been a fair amount of anxiety over the state of the Chinese economy of late. News of unexpectedly large debt burdens among Chinese local governments generated a wave of concern that recent Chinese growth has been entirely unsustainable. As the government was forced to turn off the credit tap, some supposed, property prices would fall and a hard landing would result.

    That seems an unlikely scenario to me. Chinese debt burdens are manageable and its property market dynamics are quite different from those that prevailed in western bubbles markets prior to the crash. That doesn't mean that all is entirely well in China, however. Many observers have taken some comfort in the latest GDP report from China. Output rose 9.5% year-on-year in the second quarter. That constitutes a moderate slowdown from growth in the previous quarter, and was a little above expectations. It would seem that the government's efforts to slow credit growth have not precipitated an uncontrollably rapid downturn in activity.

    Other economic data is a little more disconcerting, however. China's trade surplus surged in June . Its exports to America have been growing and its imports falling. At the same time, Chinese inflation continues to rise ; the latest reading is 6.4%. And accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves persisted in the second quarter, to the tune of $153 billion. Meanwhile, a closer look at the GDP report indicated that the contribution of fixed-asset investment to growth tumbled in June, with industrial activity offsetting the fall. Retail sales of consumer goods have held at a constant growth level for most of the year.

    What does this tell us? China's leaders recognise the need to rein in the country's building boom, but they are likely concerned about the prospects for other sectors that might provide a cushion against a falling growth contribution from construction. One hope was that a boom in affordable-housing construction might offset declines in market-rate property development, but the affordable-housing effort continues to run into delays .

    The long-run hope is that household consumption begins to pick up and drive economic growth. But as the GDP data indicate, China is struggling to mobilise its consumers. That therefore leaves the industrial export channel to pick up the slack, and that, seemingly, is what's occuring.

    Too much emphasis is placed on the yuan's peg to the dollar, but the relationship tells a useful story here. China allowed the yuan to begin appreciating against the dollar last June, but after a first tick upward it leveled off and even declined against the dollar through last summer. Why? China appeared to be troubled by the slowdown in global economic activity. In the fall, when the data turned positive again, the yuan embarked once more on a steady appreciation.

    But the yuan has once again leveled off in recent months. And this pause in appreciation is particularly curious given the problems China is having with inflation, which are being exacerbated by the reserve accumulation that accompanies its currency management. In short, now would seem to be a very good time to allow the yuan to rise a bit more. But the yuan isn't rising. I think that's because China sees little choice but to use exports to offset the impact of falling fixed-asset investment.

    The rub is this: an artificially cheap yuan is one of the ways China suppresses household purchasing power and consumer spending. Its support for exporters is discouraging households that might otherwise be flexing their muscles and leading a rise in domestic-demand growth.

    Couldn't China just let the currency rise and count on households to provide the growth that exporters no longer can? A new paper by Barry Eichengreen and Andrew Rose suggests it's not that simple. They assemble a sample of countries that left pegged currencies with the expectation that appreciation would follow, and they find that in most cases economic disaster does not result. But:

    [I]t is possible to pinpoint the kind of circumstances where the decision to move to greater flexibility is likely to be followed by a significant economic slowdown. The slowdown‐prone economies are those with exceptionally low consumption rates and high investment rates. They are economies where exports and domestic credit have been growing most rapidly. To put it simply, they are economies with Chinese characteristics.

    China needs a way to rebalance its economy without undergoing a big slowdown, of the sort that might lead to political instability (highly undesirable as a power handover looms). Until now, China managed to take steps in this direction by revving up fixed-asset investment, but it now finds itself forced to pull back on that front. Seemingly short of ideas, it has since returned to the model of big surpluses and reserve accumulation.

    It's going to end at some point. Maybe not with an economic crash. Amid a growth slowdown, however, the political system could prove somewhat more brittle.

  • (CNN) -- By now, the photo is a classic. It's become the most viewed image on Flickr -- a mesmerizing picture that suggests as much as it reveals.

    You may know it simply as the "Situation Room Photo," but you may not be aware of what some say are three subliminal messages that make it so powerful and unusual.

    The photo captures President Barack Obama huddled with his national security team in the White House Situation Room as they monitor via live video the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden.

    Most commentators have focused on the historic nature of the photo: Obama staring at the screen with a grim intensity; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, covering her mouth to repress her reaction -- the epicenter of U.S. military power hunting down its most hated foe.

    But look deeper and that photo becomes historic in a more subtle way. It's a snapshot of how much this nation's attitudes about race, women and presidential swagger are changing, several scholars and historians say.

    "The photo is visually suggestive of a new American landscape that we're still crossing into," says Saladin Ambar, a political science professor at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania.

    "When Obama was elected, there were some people who thought that we had crossed a racial threshold," Ambar says. "What his presidency is revealing is that there are many crossings ."

    A black man becomes 'protector in chief'

    The photo crosses one threshold of race in its unusual framing of an African-American man threatening violence, one black commentator says.

    For much of U.S. history, the black man has often been portrayed as the threat to America's safety -- the angry man, the thug, the one you cross the street to avoid, says Cheryl Contee, co-founder of Jack & Jill Politics , a blog focused on current affairs from a black perspective.

    But in the Situation Room photo, Contee says, the black man is America's protector.

    There's no historical precedent for this image, she says. White Americans now see a black man not just as their president but their "protector in chief," Contee says.

    "That photo is amazing," she says. "It's another step toward rehabilitation of the image of black men in American culture. It's going to forever impact how people see black men in America."

    The photo also resolves a tricky image problem for Obama, says Jerald Podair, a history professor at Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin.

    Podair says Obama has always been careful to avoid the angry black male stereotype in his public persona , but has acquired another image -- that of detachment , even weakness.

    The photo of Obama hunkered down with his national security team watching the stalking and killing of bin Laden solves both problems, Podair says.

    "He can now appear strong without being threatening. After all, he's on our side. Obama can now take up his white predecessors' mantle of 'protector in chief,' " Podair says.

    It's not certain how long that mantle will stay attached to Obama, but at least one political scientist says he's already seen the photo's impact.

    "This is one of the rare times that Tea Party supporters have referred to Obama as President Obama," says Ari Kohen, an associate professor of social justice and political science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

    Women at the center of power

    The photo also breaks ground when it comes to women, others say.

    The image is laced with testosterone : a crowded room full of powerful military and political men, some with medals bristling across their uniforms, gathered to drop America's hammer.

    Some online viewers compared it to the photos of D-Day during World War II. Another said it was a portrait of "the nexus of power in the Western world."

    But there were no iconic shots of women storming the beaches of Normandy or raising the flag at Iwo Jima.

    Go back and examine the defining historic photos of American military might in action, and women are absent, historians say.

    A glance at the now famous photos of President John F. Kennedy and his staff during the Cuban missile crisis is typical, says Ambar, the Lehigh University professor.

    The photos show square-jawed men in crew cuts and uniforms surrounding Kennedy in the White House. You can practically smell the Aqua Velva in those old black-and-white photos.

    "But if you go back and look at the Cuban missile crisis photos and the movies about it, there's no women," Ambar says. "In the movie 'Thirteen Days,' the only woman in the film was Kennedy's secretary."

    Yet you see two powerful women in the Situation Room photograph -- Clinton and Audrey Tomason, director for counterterrorism, who is straining to see from the back. Their inclusion shows how far women have come, Ambar says, even though Clinton's response is ambiguous because she's covering her mouth in what looks to be alarm.

    "God only knows what she's seeing on the screen," Ambar says. (Clinton has since said she was trying not to cough.)

    Lori Brown, a sociologist, says showing two women at the center of American military power is noteworthy , but Clinton's gesture undermines some of its impact.

    "Women are often more physical in their emotional responses and in a 'power situation' it may not seem as acceptable, but times are changing and the Situation Room needs to change, too," says Brown, a professor of sociology at Meredith College in Raleigh, North Carolina. "Her emotions were more obvious, but I am sure many of the men in the room felt the same way she did."

    Obama gets a little swagger

    The photo finally crosses the threshold of what may be called presidential swagger, historians say.

    American presidents have traditionally sold themselves as our alpha male . Theodore Roosevelt went safari hunting; Ronald Reagan cleared brush at his ranch in a cowboy hat; George W. Bush did his "Top Gun" imitation when he don ned a flight suit on the deck of an aircraft carrier.

    "There's a certain kind of machismo and swagger that Americans expect their president to reflect," says Clarence Lusane, author of "The Black History of the White House."

    Projecting that presidential swagger was so powerful that it obscured some presidents' serious illnesses, such as President Franklin Roosevelt's polio and Kennedy's hobbling assortment of ailments, including a bad back, Lusane says.

    "They were both very ill. Kennedy could barely stand for two hours. But they never let those images out because they had to project toughness. Obama, though, is a different animal."

    The photo shows why.

    If someone didn't know who Obama was, he or she probably couldn't tell that he was the president in the room, some scholars say.

    "He's not in the tallest chair," says Brown, the sociology professor at Meredith College. "He's not the center of attention. He's not even in the middle of the room."

    Yet Obama's willingness to be photographed without the typical Oval Office swagger gives birth to a new type of swagger, says Contee of Jack & Jill Politics.

    She says that photo shows Obama's self-assurance and leadership style. He seeks out the opinions of his advisers. He believes in collaboration -- all while he's taking down the baddest terrorist on the planet.

    He doesn't need to wear a "Top Gun " flight jacket to project strength, she says.

    "You would almost expect the president to be standing in that position," she says. "That shows his leadership style. He doesn't need to thrust his leadership style forward."

    Expect more snapshots such as the one from the Situation Room, says Ambar, the Lehigh University professor.

    As Obama moves into the third year of his term, photos will capture moments that show how far we've come.

    "That's part of what being the first African-American president is all about -- we're all being transformed together," he says.

    Ambar says he was so intrigued by the Situation Room photo that he cut it out to study it. He's still parsing its meaning.

    "It is an image unimaginable 30 years ago," he says. "Let us hope we have more of these in the nation's future."

  • 2011-05-06

    Osama bin Laden - [转载]

    A FEW bullets were enough. But the shots that killed Osama bin Laden in the dead of night on May 2nd in a fortified compound not far from Islamabad came after 15 years of dogged pursuit, two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, well over $1 trillion of spending and around 150,000 deaths . It is a heavy reckoning for one man’s life.

    Barack Obama, America’s president, will justifiably savour a moment so dearly bought. A reluctant warrior in other ways, he has not wavered in hunting down the foot soldiers and commanders of al-Qaeda as well as its elusive leader. The president chose a manned assault directly on Mr bin Laden rather than an air strike on his compound, as some of his advisers wished, and it paid off . Mr Obama was lucky, but he made his luck—and he deserves the credit that will now come his way (see Lexington ).

    Mr Obama has been careful to warn that violent Islamism is still a dangerous force. Al-Qaeda is active, even without Mr bin Laden (see article ). The alarming problems of Pakistan, Yemen and so many other places threaten to feed more violence. And yet the death of the world’s most wanted man comes just when radical Islam looks vulnerable to the changes sweeping across the Middle East and north Africa. The task now facing all those who yearn for a safer world is to isolate Mr bin Laden’s savage jihad just as surely as its creator was isolated behind his compound walls.

    The man who warped a faith

    Mr bin Laden matters because he swept up a ragbag of local grievances into a brand of intoxicating and violent jihad with worldwide pretensions . His vision, however impractical, of purging Islam and establishing a single Islamic caliphate appealed to Muslims disgusted by the venality of their own elites. His means of bringing it about embraced an orgy of murder and martyrdom partly directed against the “Crusader” West, particularly America. Sad to say, that also appealed to many Muslims for a while. And the whole package was decked with the riches-to-rags story of Mr bin Laden himself—a man who had given up power and wealth in Saudi Arabia, lived simply and seemed almost charmed in his capacity to defy the mightiest army in history (see Obituary ).

    Terrorists dream of setting the agenda, and in two ways Mr bin Laden succeeded beyond imagination. For many people, especially non-Muslims, the central place he reserved for violence tainted the whole of Islam. Even as Westerners came to fear bloodthirsty and barbaric Muslims, Muslims deplored degenerate and imperialist Christians. Mr bin Laden’s brand of hatred thrived on both those grotesque stereotypes .

    And by framing the fight as a clash of civilisations, he could draw the West into a global war on terror. The attacks of September 11th 2001 tipped America and the West into a fight that exacted a terrible price in blood and treasure. At home, America has diverted vast resources into a security bureaucracy. Abroad, it has been distracted from the historic challenge that American power faces in Asia.

    Along the way, America has compromised the values that are its greatest strength. This was partly by accident, because war is always cruel and messy, but also by design, through the torture of jihadist detainees and the oblivion of Guantánamo. It is not yet clear whether finding Mr bin Laden depended on torture (it probably never will be clear, given that the interrogator’s lead identifying Mr bin Laden’s courier took years to bear fruit). What is certain is that his message prospered because he could dismiss America’s commitment to freedom and human rights and claim that the country abused Muslims.

    That message is potent enough to survive Mr bin Laden’s death. Stuck in his compound, without a telephone or the internet, he had anyway become a remote figure. The al-Qaeda franchise, spread across the Sahel, in the Arabian peninsula and in cells around the world, will surely now seek to prove its potency. The hope is that the computers, discs and drives American special forces seized during their raid will wreck such plans. Terrorism being what it is, though, an attack sooner or later has every chance of succeeding.

    Strategic failure

    Even if it does, that should not obscure the fact that Mr bin Laden’s infamy in the West is losing its power to inspire his own people. This partly reflects the failure of violence to accomplish the goals he set himself in the Muslim world. Despite years of bloody strife , the Western way of life has continued to encroach on Muslims. Jihad has failed to banish non-Muslim troops from Islamic countries. Western forces remain in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kashmir is home to the Indian army, and Chechnya to the Russians. Israel still flourishes . Not one treacherous Arab government has yielded to the caliphate.

    More than that, Mr bin Laden’s desire to murder his way to salvation has at last aroused widespread disgust among Muslims. After al-Qaeda slaughtered Shia and Sunni Muslims in their thousands in Iraq, even fellow jihadis began to condemn his doctrine of takfir , under which radicals took it upon themselves to declare other Muslim apostates and kill them. According to a poll by the Pew Research Centre, confidence in Mr bin Laden in the Palestinian territories has fallen from 72% in 2003 to 34% now. In Jordan it is down from 56% to 13%.

    That still leaves a huge reservoir for recruits, but they have been hard to spot in the uprisings sweeping the Arab world. So far the Arab spring has cast violent jihad to the margins. When young Egyptians crowded into Cairo’s Tahrir Square, they wanted rights, not a caliph. Even the Muslim Brothers look as if they will opt for civil society rather than theocracy .

    Political change in the Arab world will be neither smooth nor immediate. In some places it is sure to go wrong; in others it may yield to hardline Islam. And yet, thanks to the Arab spring, Islam stands its best chance in generations of re-engaging with politics to found institutions in which religious and civil life can coexist. That would be a devastating refutation of Mr bin Laden’s ideology of universal Muslim struggle.

    How to encourage it? First, don’t relent on counter-terrorism. Al-Qaeda will need stopping for years to come. Second, recognise that jihadists will be defeated mainly by Muslims themselves. That means stabilising the crescent of Muslim countries, mostly outside the Arab world, where broken government has allowed terrorism to gain a hold. All are hard cases. Some, like Somalia and Mali, are only susceptible to containment at best. Afghanistan is close enough to the drawdown of NATO troops in 2014 not to pull out in haste . Most worrying of all is Pakistan (see Banyan ). In spite of what looks like duplicity over Mr bin Laden’s hiding place, the nuclear power is too dangerous to abandon. Better for America to hold Pakistan close than cut it loose.

    And last there are the Arab countries. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help (see article ); but more vital is Western support for the aspirations of the Arab spring. When Mr bin Laden struck on 9/11 the West had few means of defending itself but by attacking him directly and by striking a Faustian bargain with the Arab world’s oppressive rulers. His death comes when Arab opinion is at last flowing in a new direction. It is too good a chance to waste.

  •  

    THE first question that many in the West will have asked on hearing the news of Osama bin Laden’s killing  is: does this make us any safer? The cautious reply of security experts is that in the short term the danger of terrorist attacks may go up as al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups look for ways to avenge the death of their symbolic leader, but that in the long-term Mr bin Laden’s demise may erode the al-Qaeda brand and thus its ability to influence the global jihadist movement. Even that may be too optimistic. Osama bin Laden dead is a great deal better than Osama bin Laden alive, but the truth is that his death may mean rather more to his enemies than to his followers.

    Perhaps if the opportunity to capture or kill Mr bin Laden in the Tora Bora Mountains back in November 2001 had not been spurned, the blow to al-Qaeda would have been substantial. But over the best part of a decade, the terrorist organisation has had more than enough time to adapt to life without Mr bin Laden as much more than its titular head. The fact that the compound where Mr bin Laden had been hiding since 2005 appeared to have no internet access tells its own story of his diminished operational significance. Apart from the occasional rambling video recording smuggled to Al Jazeera, Mr bin Laden’s main value to al-Qaeda was his ability to inspire and unify as the network evolved into a classic franchise operation, albeit one based on quasi-tribal forms of allegiance.

    In the past ten years, even as “core al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan has been ground dow n by special forces and drone attacks to no more than a couple of hundred active members, its network has spread, new operational leaders have been recruited and trained, resilient cells formed and new bases established. Core al-Qaeda has learned how to work with local and nationalist jihadist groups, helping to amplify and re-orient their violence, sometimes encouraging and presiding over collaboration between groups. Regardless of Mr bin Laden’s fate, the Taliban will continue the fight in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, while franchise outfits in Yemen (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular, or AQAP), North Africa (al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, or AQIM) and affiliates, such as al Shabab in Somalia, will carry on much as before. For now, both al Shabab and AQIM are mainly regional players, although Westerners are sometimes targets as was the case in the bomb attack on a tourist café in Marrakesh last week. However, Western security sources see AQAP as a major and growing threat both to “far” and “near” enemies.

    AQAP, under the leadership of Nasser al Wahayshi, a former personal aide of Mr bin Laden’s, and Anwar al Awlaki, an American-Yemeni cleric, has been the instigator of several recent terror plots aimed at America, from the Fort Hood shootings to the Christmas Day “underwear bomber” and the highly-sophisticated attempt last October to blow up two Chicago-bound cargo planes with bombs concealed in printer cartridges . With Mr bin Laden dead and its bases in south and east Yemen able to provide better protection from attack than core al-Qaeda’s North Waziristan heartland, AQAP has the potential to increase its influence over the whole organisation. To do so, however, it may need to carry out a successful spectacular to confirm its capabilities, which is easier said than done.

    Such spectaculars can also take years to plan. In the meantime, al-Qaeda’s response to Mr bin Laden’s death is most likely to be in the form of activating sleepers to carry out “lone wolf” attacks in the West and more mayhem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In other words, business as usual, only perhaps a bit more so in the weeks and months ahead. After a decade of relentless military and financial attrition , al-Qaeda may not be what it was, but it has evolved into something no less dangerous. Like a smart chief executive, Mr bin Laden’s greatest achievement is to have built something that no longer needed him.

  • 2010-12-22

    A new Grand Tour - [转载]

    Chinese tourists

    IN THE grounds of King’s College, Cambridge, grows perhaps the most famous willow tree in China. It was immortalised by Xu Zhimo, a 20th-century poet with all the attributes required for lasting celebrity: talent, a rackety love life and a dramatic early death (plane crash at 34). With each passing year, growing crowds of Chinese tourists visit the tree and a nearby marble boulder inscribed with lines from Xu’s poem, “On leaving Cambridge ”.

    Locals and tourists from elsewhere pass the tree without a second glance. But for educated Chinese, who learned Xu’s poem in school, this tranquil spot, watched over by handsome white cows and an arched stone bridge, is a shrine to lost youth. Many are visibly moved, even as the cameras click and flash. Xu’s verses help explain the great prestige Cambridge University enjoys in China, nudging it a notch or two ahead of Oxford. They also explain why many educated Chinese have heard of punting .

    Xu’s willow is just one stop on an emerging grand tour of Europe, the continent that routinely tops polls of dream Chinese destinations. China’s newly mobile middle classes like to visit established spots like the Eiffel Tower, the Louvre and Venice’s Grand Canal . But the visitors have also marked out a grand tour all of their own, shaped by China’s fast-developing consumer culture and by distinctive quirks of culture, history and politics. The result is jaw-dropping fame, back in China, for a list of places that some Europeans would struggle to pinpoint on a map: places like Trier, Metzingen, Verona, Luxembourg, Lucerne and the Swiss Alp known as Mount Titlis.

    For decades Asian economic might has gone hand in hand with government programmes to encourage newly affluent citizens to take holidays abroad. In Japan the Ministry of Tourism launched a “Ten Million Programme” to double outbound tourist departures from 5m to 10m between 1986 and 1991. Tourism from South Korea exploded a decade later. Officials in these countries hoped that despatching tourists around the globe would signal their new wealth. It also offered a tangible reward to citizens toiling in the pressure-cooker atmosphere of an economic boom. In China foreign travel is part of a slightly different compact between the state and the new middle classes: unprecedented freedom and fun in exchange for the maintenance of one-party rule at home.

    In search of Bordeaux and Hugo Boss

    When the bamboo curtain lifted a generation ago, the first contact many Chinese had with the outside world was in the form of imported goods, whose foreign fame was viewed as intrinsic proof of quality. Even today, seen from a Chinese tour bus, the continent of Europe resembles not so much an ancient collection of cities and nations as a glittering emporium stocked with brands. Those brands are not always commercial products: the grand tour takes in the birthplaces of world-famous people, the seats of globally renowned institutions and—as in Cambridge—sites linked to well-known literary works.

    A sketch map of the Chinese grand tour must begin in France, the country seen as offering all the essential European virtues: history, romance, luxury and quality. Paris shops such as Louis Vuitton are essential stops: witness their Mandarin-speaking staff. In 2009 Chinese tourists passed Russians as the highest-spending non-European visitors to France, according to a survey of duty-free shops. The south of the country is also popular, thanks in part to widely available translations of Peter Mayle’s book “A Year in Provence” and in part to a slushy Chinese television mini-series, “Dreams Link ”, which was filmed amid the lavender fields and walled citadel s of the Midi.

    China’s freshly minted millionaires and billionaires are particularly obsessed with the wine country of Bordeaux, as red wine has taken over from expensive brandy as the business lubricant of choice. At the very pinnacle of desire is a visit to (or just a glimpse of) Château Lafite Rothschild , home of the claret which has become a favoured show-off brand for Chinese plutocrats . Visits to Château Lafite itself are reserved for invited guests, but China’s would-be tycoons are not put off . Jean-François Zhou of Ansel Travel, a Paris-based firm that brings 15,000 Chinese visitors to Europe each year, recently sent a group down to Bordeaux by bus. After an express tour , one of the coach party snapped up two cases of wine at €600 ($790) a bottle.

    From France, Chinese groups typically travel south towards Italy via the casinos in Nice or Monaco (gambling is discouraged in China, but wildly popular). Venice and Rome are stops for every nation’s tourists, but the Chinese grand tour also demands a visit to Verona . One site draws them: a 13th-century mansion linked, a bit spurious ly, to “Romeo and Juliet”. That play is doubly admired in China. It was one of the first of Shakespeare’s works to be translated into Mandarin, and its storyline is hailed as matching that of a popular Chinese folk tale , the “Butterfly Lovers ”. Chinese tourists have their pictures taken below an ancient balcony said to be Juliet’s, and next to a bronze statue of the tragic heroine. Then it is back on the bus, and northward.

    In Germany cities such as Bonn and Trier are as important as more obvious sites like Cologne and Frankfurt (a hub for lots of China flights). Bonn means Beethoven : his birthplace there is a coveted stop for educated Chinese, who are avid fans of classical music. In Trier it is not the city or its Roman ruins that attracts the tourists. They come to see the Karl-Marx-Haus , birthplace of the revolutionary. The Marx museum estimates that 13,000 Chinese tramp around the house each year. Mandarin inscriptions fill the museum’s guest books. In the early morning and evening, large crowds of Chinese have their pictures taken outside the house before heading to their next destination.

    A stop in Metzingen involves a tribute to another German, the suitmaker Hugo Boss. A short drive from Frankfurt, Metzingen is home to several factory outlets , where Chinese shoppers vie with Russians and Indians as the biggest spenders. It is a standing joke among Chinese travellers that many products snapped up abroad bear “Made in China” labels. But there is some sense to this seeming madness. Thanks to hefty taxes and customs duties, European brands are routinely 40% more expensive back home. In China they are also quite likely to be fakes.

    As France means wine and handbags , Brussels means chocolate. Chen Yongjie, a Suzhou native , works in the Pelicaen chocolate shop of Brussels, next to the Mannekin Pis (a small statue of a boy peeing that is unaccountably popular with tourists of all nationalities). Most Chinese think Belgian chocolate too sweet, Miss Chen reports. This does not stop them buying large quantities for friends and colleagues back home.

    Many of the Chinese tourists in the Benelux countries are members of daibiaotuan , official or business delegations with a reputation as boondoggles . As a result of this bureaucratic orientation, the grand tour’s Belgian leg includes stops outside the Berlaymont, as the headquarters of the European Commission is known. Resplendent in the unofficial uniform of the daibiaotuan —dark trousers, dark polo shirt , dark blouson jacket and leather manbag —officials on tour queue up to have their pictures taken in front of the Berlaymont’s nameplate , the nearest thing to a scenic spot in the glass and concrete canyons of the “European Quarter”. The same delegations enjoy less success at NATO’s headquaters which is off limits to tourists. The pluckiest daibiaotuan are not deterred. They can be seen parked on the roadside opposite NATO, taking pictures of its flagpoles across six lanes of traffic.

    Taking pictures is a serious business for members of a daibiaotuan . Goofy poses are not encouraged. The Chinese word “qiezi ”—pronounced chee-eh-dze and meaning “aubergine ”—fulfils the same function as “cheese” in the English-speaking world, generating what is held to be a restrained yet photogenic smile. Childish pleasure can be derived from murmuring qiezi ” when walking past a delegation busy taking p ictures: it reliably generates surprised cries of “did that foreigner just say aubergine?”


    In Luxembourg the Chinese tourists pause just long enough to photograph the palace of its reigning grand duke. This pocket-sized country, with a population 3,000 times smaller than China’s, is admired for its national wealth per person (the highest in the world by some measures). It also allows Chinese tour groups to knock off another country with minimal effort, allowing for extra boasting back home.

    Chinese tourists reserve more than a third of their holiday budgets for shopping

    France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg all lie within the Schengen Area, a border-free zone that can be visited on a single visa. This appeals to Chinese tourists, who must submit reams of papers and face a long list of intrusive questions about their finances, employment and personal circumstances to obtain visas for Europe. In 2008 Switzerland joined the Schengen club and Chinese visitor numbers instantly soared.

    In Switzerland the essential stop is the canton of Lucerne . With a lake, an historic city and mountains all in a compact area, it amounts to a “mini-Switzerland”, saving time. The Lucerne brand includes Mount Titlis, easily reached by bus and cable car. The mountain is topped by a glacier , offering visitors the chance to visit an ice cave and mess about on sledges even in summer (high season for Chinese tourism). There are Chinese-speaking staff on the peak , and a Chinese restaurant. In perhaps Europe’s oddest claim to Chinese fame, a Chengdu-born gymnast , Li Donghua, claims to have seen a vision of Buddha while visiting Mount Titlis. This he took as a sign that he would triumph at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. He duly won a gold medal. His tale is recorded on a mountain-top plaque .

    Surprisingly few tourists visit Britain. In August 2010 David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister, noted with some bemusement that Germany is poised to enter the leading ten foreign destinations for Chinese tourists, while Britain languishes in 22nd place.


    Mr Cameron called for promoting Britain’s heritage—a departure from his Labour predecessors with their focus on modernity and “cool Britannia”. Mr Zhou says his Chinese clients are fascinated that such a titchy island once ran such a large empire and dared start the Opium wars . In reality, as the leader of a Eurosceptic political party, Mr Cameron is unlikely to take the transformative step of joining the Schengen Area. If Britain followed Switzerland into the border-free zone, “half the Chinese tourists on the continent would head to London on the Eurostar,” says Mr Zhou.

      Enjoyment isn’t the point

    Chinese tourists know they are more coveted for their money than loved in Europe. In surveys of Chinese travel agents, the continent is most frequently described as “beautiful” and “historic”—but rarely as friendly. Europeans are described as both “civilised ” and “cold”. Even before they leave China, the travellers are nagged to mind their manners and told to act as “ambassadors ” for their country. Several times in the past few years the Spiritual Civilisation Steering Committee of the country’s C0mmunist Party has issued chivvying circulars calling on Chinese tourists to avoid queue-jumping , loudness or haggling in shops with fixed prices.

     

    The European travel industry uses the sniffy phrase “sleep cheap, shop expensive” to describe Chinese visitors. Chinese tour operators are notorious for bargaining down travel and hotel costs. A 2008 study by the European Travel Commission, an industry group, estimates that Chinese tourists reserve more than a third of their holiday budgets for shopping. It is “very difficult”, the study laconically concludes, for established European tour operators to compete with rivals whose transport strategy may involve a “Chinese-speaking waiter driving a minibus”. Even Mr Zhou admits that Chinese travellers are “hard work”, not like the “disciplined ” Japanese.

    Tourism is certainly not about discovering new food. A 2006 survey of Chinese coach travellers found that 46% had eaten “European” food only once, and 10% not at all, during holidays on the continent. Clients at Ansel Travel are typically offered foreign food once in each country: seafood in Paris, ham knuckle in Germany, pasta in Italy and so on. After that, “it’s Chinese all the way.” Many stay in suburban hotels and eat noodles.

    This is because excitement and acquisition are prized over pleasant, relaxing experiences. The Chinese are keen on European luxury, says Andy Xie, a Shanghai-based economist—they just aren’t so interested in luxurious hotels and lavish meals. Coming from a newly affluent , increasingly unequal society, they have a strong preference for the accumulation of material goods. After all, a Swiss watch lasts a lifetime, whereas “if you want a good bed, you can have that at home.”

    And Western goods may not be valued for the same reasons they are in the West. Château Lafite’s astonishing fame in China is a story about the country’s political economy, not about the enjoyment of wine, says Mr Xie. Too often at banquets in China he has watched first-growth claret being downed in joyless , glass-draining toasts, well into the small hours . “Château Lafite is for serving to high political officials in the hope of high returns. Government officials want to drink it because it is expensive. And people buy it because it is expensive. It becomes self-fulfilling .”

    A new vision of Europe

    Europeans may sneer at Chinese tourists who pursue Beethoven, Bordeaux and Hugo Boss with the same undiscriminating avidity . But Europeans used to tour their own continent in a similar way. The original Grand Tour was also a display of relative economic power, as the gilded youth of northern, industrialising Europe headed to France, Switzerland and Italy to pick up a veneer of continental “polish ” and crate loads of antique souvenirs (many of them fake). Those tourists, too, had less fun than they let on : they grumbled about the food, their rapacious guides and the discomforts of travel.

    The face of Chinese tourism is also rapidly changing. The heyday of the daibiaotuan has passed. A decade ago, an official fancying a holiday more or less had to land a spot on one of these delegations, paid for from state or company funds or by joint-venture partners from the West. Today, such delegations are under much more scrutiny , and tourist visas are easier to obtain. Many travellers are now on their second or third visit to Europe: group tours are duly slowing down and stopping to savour local culture. Individual tourism is tipped as the next big thing. Yet individual visitors may create itineraries no more conventional than those dictated by tour groups.

    In China, Xu Zhimo is loved not just as a romantic poet: his plain, passionate verse shook up a country grown exhausted and old . Xu is already a secular icon for Chinese students at Cambridge, whose diligence puts local undergraduates to shame. He would make a fine patron for the next waves of Chinese grand tourists—private travellers with the confidence to draw their own map of an old continent. Their list of important sights and experiences does not resemble the genteel image that Europeans have of their own homeland—it includes more duty-free shopping, for a start. But it is a fresh vision . With their economic power and hunger for new experiences, China’s restless middle classes have conjured a new Europe into life.

     

  • 2010-12-20

    Barack Houdini Obama - [转载]

    Lexington

    IN THE summer of 1912 Harry Houdini was clapped in manacles and leg-irons, stuffed into a crate that had been weighed down by lead, and dropped from a tugboat into New York’s East River. Less than a minute later, he was free. That, more or less, is the trick Barack Obama is currently trying to copy.

    Of course, Mr Obama has not been tossed overboard literally. But consider his trajectory so far. He campaigned in poetry (2008), governed in prose (2009) and then the wheels fell off his presidency . Although 2010 brought legislative gains, including the great prize of health reform, the year was bracketed by political losses. At its beginning he lost his supermajority in the Senate. By its end he had lost his majority in the House. An immobilised president who lacks the numbers to put his measures through Congress might just as well be trussed up in a crate.

    Unless he is an escapologist , that is . Well before November’s mid-term shellacking turfed the Democratic majority out of the House, Obama-watchers wondered whether this president had the ideological flexibility to do what Bill Clinton did in the same predicament after the mid-terms of 1994. Now, after the tax deal Mr Obama struck last week with the Republican leadership, under which the “temporary” Bush-era tax reductions that were supposed to expire on December 31st look set to be extended for everyone, they have at least the beginning of an answer. Like Mr Clinton, this man can turn on a dime .

    Mr Obama promised repeatedly to increase taxes on the rich (ie, individuals earning more than $200,000 and couples earning more than $250,000). How does he justify changing his mind? Simple: politics is the art of the possible, elections have consequences and the Democrats lacked the numbers they needed (the Senate had tried and failed) to keep the tax reduction in place for poorer Americans but let them expire for the rich. If he had not budged , he says, the Republicans would have let everyone’s taxes rise—a blow not only to taxpayers but also to economic growth. Besides, to sweeten the bitter medicine, Mr Obama managed in his negotiations to attach a mini-stimulus that the Republicans would never otherwise have countenanced .

    All of this makes perfect sense. But it makes the sort of sense that in the 1950s inspired Nye Bevan, a firebrand on the left of Britain’s Labour Party, to describe the centrist Hugh Gaitskell as a “desiccated calculating machine”. Like Gaitskell, Mr Obama now stands accused by his own party’s bitter progressives of lacking fire, fight, principle and backbone. “Hardly anybody in the Democratic caucus here feels that the president tried hard enough to deliver on his campaign promises,” said Alan Grayson of Florida. Mr Obama did not help his cause with the left by lashing out at “sanctimoniouspurists who would prefer to feel good themselves than do what was good for the people.

    If you are a president who has just suffered the political equivalent of being stuffed in a crate and dropped in a river, does it make sense to antagonise your own party this way? Maybe. When faced with impasse, wriggling through the middle does not have to be dishonourable . It can even lead to political recovery. It was presumably to make this point that Mr Obama invited Mr Clinton, the consummate comeback kid, to a press conference at the White House, where the old charmer and pioneer of “triangulation ” pronounced the tax compromise “a good deal” and told a new generation of political reporters that “there’s never a perfect bipartisan bill in the eyes of a partisan.”

    Mr Obama’s good fortune is that it is not only progressives who find the deal unpalatable . Conservatives hate it too. Charles Krauthammer , an influential columnist, calls it “the swindle of the year”: the artless Republicans let Mr Obama smuggle in a huge new stimulus, bigger than the first, just in time for his re-election bid in 2012. Mitt Romney, seeking the Republican nomination once again, is unhappy that the tax cuts have not been made permanent. Tea-partiers hate the burden on the deficit. Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina complains that the deal “raises the death tax ” (in fact it would reinstate the estate tax , suspended in 2010 only, at a lower level than planned).

    If Mr Obama’s luck holds, the passionate intensity of the conservatives might just cancel out that of the progressives and so affirm, in the eyes of the majority in the centre, his own claim to be reaching for precious common ground in the tricky terrain of divided government. That cannot be what Mitch McConnell and John Boehner, the Republican leaders in Congress, intended when they made their deal with the president. But, having made it, they too risk losing face if they allow it to unravel .

    Can we see you do that again?

    Houdini performed his trick for startled audiences over and over again. Mr Obama will find doing this harder. The incoming Republicans have no interest in allowing him a repeat performance, and there is a limit to the number of times a president seeking re-election can trample on the feelings of his own party.

    Besides, to win re-election in 2012 Mr Obama needs to prove that he is more than an escapologist or a calculating machine. Some of the fire, fight, principle and backbone that has gone missing since the inspiring campaign of 2008 has to become visible again. He has said recently that he is guided by a “north star”, that America is passing through another “Sputnik moment”, that he intends to reform the tax code and tackle the deficit. But none of this has yet cohered into a clear vision for the next two years. Even his shrinking band of steadfast supporters worries now that, along with his loss of the House and the fraying of his coalition, Mr Obama has lost his sense of direction. He had better disabuse them soon. The British might occasionally elect a desiccated calculating machine. Americans expect something more.

  • Banyan

    “WHY has the external environment changed?” asks a Chinese scholar of international relations in Beijing, pondering a bad few months for Chinese diplomacy. Nothing big has changed in China, nor has it s own foreign policy shifted . Yet it has lurched from quarrel to quarrel with all its most important partners. The temptation for Chinese nationalists is to see their country as the victim of a Western conspiracy to keep China down, just as it is beginning to take its rightful place in the world. A more plausible explanation may be the ineptness of Chinese diplomacy, made up so often of hectoring and threats.

    Exhibit one for China’s conspiracy theorists is the awa rd of the N0bel pe'ace pr1ze to L1u X'i'a0b0, a jaile'd2 act2'ivist. Global Times , a party newspaper, said the award ceremony marked the beginning of a “trial by history against the N0bel c0mmittee”. But it was China itself that, rather than loftily ignoring the perceived slight , turned attendance in Oslo on December 10th into a with-us-or-against-us test of friendship. By this misleading benchmark , most of those invited were against. Some, such as India, had to withstand concerted Chinese arm-twisting .

    The 17 countries that heeded China’s boycott call hardly justified its claim that most countries backed its stand . Some, like Vietnam, might have liked to see China embarrassed , but would certainly stand up for a government’s sovereign right to lock up peaceful dissidents . So would Cuba and Iran. A few others, like Pakistan, are “all-weather friends”. The only real surprise was the Philippines, which is proud of its democratic freedom. But its foreign ministry was anxious to placate China after a botched hostage rescue in August, in which eight tourists from Hong Kong were killed. Even so , the Philippine president’s office pleaded a “scheduling conflict” for his ambassador. The local press has pilloried the government for its timidity .

    Official Chinese commentators have repeatedly called the prize-giving a “farce ”. The word would be more accurately applied to the award in Beijing on December 9th of the first-ever “Confucius peace prize”. The winner was Lien Chan, a former vice-president of Taiwan, much liked by the Chinese government for his conciliatory approach. Mr Lien, claiming he was unaware of the prize, was, like Mr Liu, unable to receive it. In his absence , it was given to an “angel of peace”, a six-year-old girl who found herself cuddling a bundle of 100,000 yuan ($15,000) in cash. This has not gone down well in Taiwan, one of the few places where Chinese policy has recently seemed quite successful (perhaps because China sees Taiwan as a domestic problem).

    Elsewhere, China has antagonised America, Japan and South Korea by refusing to condemn North Korea for its attacks on the South. It had already alienated a friendly government in Japan by its aggressive response to the detention in September of a Chinese trawler captain who rammed a Japanese coastguard vessel. It has succeeded in uniting many of the littoral states in the South China Sea against its high-handed refusal to discuss its territorial claims there. In November it even picked a fight with the Vatican, by ordaining a bishop not endorsed by the pope and forcing some of his bishops to attend.

    Maybe China has decided that, contrary to its own protestations , it does not really need smooth foreign relations. Or maybe its diplomacy is a mess. The Chinese scholar offers three possible explanations. One is the confusing proliferation of “non-diplomatic” bodies and special-interest groups in foreign policy, from oil firms to the army to, in the case of Japan, the marine affairs and fisheries bureaus. But the other two may be more telling : the increasing importance of Chinese public opinion and the absence of any senior political figure in charge of foreign policy. The foreign minister, Yaang Jieechi, is not a member of the C0mmunist Party’s 25-member Politburo , let alone its nine-member, decision-making Standing Committee. There is nobody to thump the table for foreign relations. Abroad does not matter very much.

     

    At least, however, China’s threats often prove hollow . Despite India’s refusal to kowtow over the dissident Mr Liu, for example, China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, went ahead this week with his planned visit to India. And China has confirmed that America’s defence secretary, Robert Gates, is to visit in the new year, ending a freeze on high-level military contacts imposed last January after America sold arms to Taiwan. Little has been heard since of the commercial sanctions against American firms that China threatened at the time.

    My name is Liu

    Indeed, for all the threats and vituperation directed at foreign governments, it is mostly Chinese citizens who suffer. At home, the authorities’ bite is as bad as their bark . They fear organised protest and dissent far more than foreign embarrassment. Mr Liu’s wife has been kept incommunicado . Human-rights groups say hundreds of people were interrogated or detained ahead of the Nobel ceremony. Many were prevented from leaving the country, lest they turn up in Oslo. News of the ceremony there was largely blacked out .

    Even in China, however, the government is not having things all its own way . Microbloggers have been posting eulogies to “the people they admire most”, who happen to be named Liu, and whose lives echo the Nobel prize-winner’s: a table-tennis player, a famous actress, a champion hurdler , a Cantopop star and Liu Shaoqi, a former president hounded to his death during the Cultural Revolution . “He was unjustly accused and spent many years in prison,” read the post, by a writer who, like Global Times , takes the long view. “But I believe that all of this is but the test of history, because he said that, fortunately, history is written by the people.” Not if the party can help it, it isn’t.

  • 2010-12-11

    asiapespective - [转载]

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    With our global vision, local market experience and network we will minimize risk and maximize our client’s investment in the Chinese market. We will provide appropriate guidance to facilitate the smoothest transition possible to new market entrants.

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    World Class procurement and a requirement for lowest cost options will, typically, strengthen the supply chain. Its effective management is essential to identify excess inventory, shipping and overall costs. The changes in cost dynamics on a global basis are an excellent reason to conduct reviews of existing arrangements.

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    Asia Perspective offers consulting on commodity markets using a wide range of fundamental and technical analysis of key market instruments.

    World economies are undergoing a fundamental change and with it an unprecedented change in the dynamics of supply and demand. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has significantly contributed to this effect at a global scale. Markets from raw material to intermediate and finished product are all influenced by supply and demand from China. Understanding these influences is essential to be a successful global company.

    The Chinese domestic market offers many opportunities for both Chinese and foreign companies. Our mandate is to provide our clients with quick and precise insights that can potentially lead to extraordinary opportunities when they arise.

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  • 2010-12-09

    Friends, or else - [转载]

    Living with China’s rise will test America’s diplomacy as never before

    IN A recent essay Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, describes the following exchange with his American counterparts : “I put this catechism to them: ‘Do you think America should treat China as an equal if its power grows equal to America’s?’ The answer is always no. Then I ask, ‘Do you think China will settle for anything less than being treated as equal?’ The answer to that is always no, too. Then I ask, ‘So how do you expect the US and China to get along?’ I usually get a shrug by way of reply.”

    That shrug is a measure of America’s difficulty in designing a China policy. America wants China to be a thriving market for its goods. It also wants China to become an active, responsible power in world affairs. Yet at the same time it feels threatened by China’s growing economic, industrial, diplomatic and military might . When America dislikes a position China has taken, it cries foul . This mix of partnership and rivalry is a recipe for confusion.

    One way to resolve these tensions would be to put security first. America could aim to block China now before it gets any stronger. America won the cold war by isolating the Soviet economy and stalemating its armed forces. But trying that again would be a bad idea, as Robert Art explains in a recent issue of Political Science Quarterly . For one thing, the cost would be astronomical ; for another, America might suffer as much as China. The two countries’ economies are intertwined and China owns more American government debt than anyone else. In war, nations override such factors out of necessity . If an American president tried to override them in peace out of choice, he would face dissent at home and opprobrium abroad.


    The risks of containment

    In any case , a policy of containment risks backfiring , except against an unambiguously hostile China. Unless America could persuade large parts of the world to join in, China would still have access to most markets. A belligerent United States would risk losing the very alliances in Asia that it was seeking to protect. And Joseph Nye, of the Kennedy School at Harvard, has argued that the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one.

    America may one day feel it has no choice but to focus on security alone, which is what China fears. By contrast, to focus on economics and forget security makes no sense at all. America has vital interests in Asia. It wants to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula and Japan. It has allies to protect and threats to police . It needs accessible sea lane s and open markets. America is the world’s pre-eminent power. It cannot surrender Asia without losing influence everywhere else.

    Hence for the past 15 years America has fallen back on a two-track China policy . Barack Obama articulated the first track on his visit to China in November last year. He told the students at Fudan University, in Shanghai: “The United States insists we do not seek to contain China’s rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and successful member of the community of nations.” This means, as the president later explained in front of Hu Jintao, his Chinese opposite number , that China’s “growing economy is joined by growing responsibilities”.

    Engagement ” is backed by a second policy, best described as hedging . America must be able to deploy enough force to deter China. Presidents do not articulate this track quite so eagerly , but Admiral Robert Willard, head of Pacific Command, was clear enough in his remarks to Congress earlier this year: “Until…it is determined that China’s intent is indeed benign , it is critical that we maintain the readiness of our postured forces; continually reinforce our commitment to our allies and partners in the region; and meet each challenge by the PRC in a professional manner that is consistent with international law.”

    America faced some straightforward, if terrifying , calculations in its monochromatic relationship with the Soviet Union. By contrast, its technicolour dealings with China are less apocalyptic , but many times more complex—almost unmanageably so .

    In principle, the policy’s two tracks fit together well. Engagement is designed to reward good behaviour and hedging to deter bad. In practice, however, the hedge risks undermining the engagement. To see why , consider that the existence of two tracks acts as an excuse to leave important issues unresolved in America. China hawks a nd China doves can all support the policy, because both can continue to think that they will ultimately be proved right.

    That is politically handy in Washington, but hardly ideal as a policy. The engagement tends to be run by China specialists in the state department and the hedge tends to be run out of the Pentagon. In theory the policy’s two dimensions should be weighted according to whether or not China’s behaviour is threatening. With the best will in the world, the departments of state and defence do not always work well together. All too often , a twin-track policy can function as two separate policies.


    Read my lips

    That matters because Mr Obama’s generous words towards China are not taken at face value there. However sincere, no president’s words could be: pledges are broken and presidents come and go. America sends a signal when it redeploys naval forces to the Pacific and its admirals tell Congress that “China’s interest in a peaceful and stable environmentis difficult to reconcile with [its] evolving military capabilities.” Those judgments make good sense for America’s security, but they get in the way of the message that the United States welcomes China’s rise and has no intention of blocking it.

    Hedging is not engagement’s only complication . For much of the past 15 years, commerce drew America towards China. Indeed, globalisation became a large part of the engagement story. But now that one in ten Americans is without work, economic policy has taken on a protectionist tinge . If China loses the political backing of America’s big-business lobby , which has lately been growing restive at its treatment in China, then the tone in Washington will shift further. Thus commerce could also start to add to Chinese fears that America will ultimately choose to block it.

    The second doubt about America’s China policy is whether America has fully accepted what engagement asks of it. The policy rests on two notions . First, that China can develop as a “satisfied power”—one that feels no need to overturn the post-war order created and maintained by America. And second, that if China more or less abides by global norms , America will be able to accommodate its interests. So engagement supposes that China and America can find a stable mix of Chinese adherence and American accommodation .

    Does China abide by “global norms”? At one time the common belief was that, as Bill Clinton said, “when it comes to human rights and religious freedom, China remains on the wrong side of history.” Some Western analysts like to issue caveats about devious , far-sighted Chinese strategy. Against this racial stereotype, however, it was America, not China, that founded its policy on the maxim of Sun Tzu that it is best to win without fighting.

    Chinese values have changed beyond recognition since Mao’s day, when terror was dismally routine . As Richard McGregor writes in his book, “The Party”, terror is now used sparing ly. Hu Jintao’s China works on seduction and bribery rather than suppression. And yet China is still a one-party state and terror remains essential to its survival. When the party needs protecting, it is applied without sc ruple .

    Likewise, in international affairs China no longer backs insurgencies against its neighbours or routinely adopts intransigent positions, seemingly for the sake of it. Yet the West still finds it a difficult partner. American critics such as Gary Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute in Washington accuse China of a “supermarket approach”: it buys what it must , picks up what it wants and ignores what it does not.


    Hope is not a policy

    The hope is that in years to come China will indeed grow to be more democratic and that it will play its part in world affairs. But, says Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state under George Bush, “hope is not a policy.” Given the problems of Western democracies and China’s economic success and relative stability, says Richard Woolcott, a special envoy for the Australian prime minister, China’s conversion to a multiparty democracy no longer seems quite so inevitable . Just now, the Communist Party looks firmly in control.

    Suppose, therefore, that China remains a communist, authoritarian , one-party state with a growing appetite to get its way. Can America accommodate it?

    Some American thinkers, like John Ikenberry, of Princeton University, make the argument that America has created a rules-based system that is uniquely able to absorb new members. Institutions like the United Nations, the G20, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could, in theory at least, operate even without American leadership. According to this picture, America can accept China so long as it fits in with this order.

    But the picture is flawed . America has indeed been willing to be bound by rules in ways that 19th-century European powers never were. That is one reason why so many countries have been prepared to live under its sway . However, when America thinks important interests are at stake , it still ignores the rules, just like the next hegemon . In 2005 the bid of the China National Offshore Oil Company to buy America’s Unocal was, in effect, blocked after a public outcry . When America wanted a nuclear deal with India, it rode a coach and horses through the NPT . It fought in the Balkans in the 1990s and again in Iraq in 2003 without the endorsement of the United Nations. It may yet go to war with Iran on the same basis .

    This is not to dispute the merits of each case, though some of those decisions looked foolish even at the time. Rather the point is that superpowers break the rules when they must—and nobody can stop them. Over time that logic will increasingly apply to China too. America must decide whether “accommodating China” means living with this or denying it.

    In fact, there are difficulties with judging whether China is a responsible stakeholder. From the Chinese point of view, America always seems to define acceptable international conduct as falling in with its own policy. In the words of Yuan Peng, of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, America’s complaint is “not that China says no to global responsibility or denies its role in world affairs, but rather that it declines to say yes to every US request”.

    Accommodation is easy when that means letting China do what America wants. But will America let China do things that it does not want? The shadow overhanging America’s engagement policy is that China will not change enough to satisfy America and America will not yield enough to satisfy China. That may sound abstract, but it could at any time become brutally real, either on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait .


    Korean conundrum

    Nobody knows whether the North Korean regime will survive, nor what might come after Kim Jong Il and Kim Junior. But imagine for a moment that, on the death of the Dear Leader, North Korea descends into anarchy or lashes out , as it did in the island attack last month that killed South Korean servicemen and civilians. The ensuing crisis would severely test the capacity of China and America to live with each other.

    Everyone would be worried about North Korea’s nuclear weapons. America may want to seize them, but China would not like American soldiers on its borders. Nor would China wish America or South Korea to assert control over the North, an ally and a buffer . In the longer run, China may expect to regain the sort of influence over a unified Korea that, as the dominant Asian land power , it has exercised throughout most of history.

    This raises a host of questions. Would America trust China to mop up North Korea’s plutonium and enriched uranium ? Would China accept the idea that South Korean troops should re-establish order in the North? Would it allow Korean reunification? If that happened, would America contemplate ultimately withdrawing its troops from the peninsula?

    Depressingly little thought has been given to these questions. As far as anybody knows, China is not willing even to discuss them with America, because it does not want to betray a lack of confidence in its eccentric ally in the North. Yet, if talking about Korea is awkward now, it will be even more fraught in the teeth of a crisis.

    If the two Koreas share the world’s scariest land border, the Taiwan Strait is its scariest sea passage . China’s insistence on reunification is absolute. The story is told of how, a few years back, the editor of a Shanghainese newspaper celebrated a new semiconductor factory in the city as the biggest in China. Because he had forgotten about Taiwan, he had to offer self-criticism and take a pay cut .

    However, rather than beat Taiwan with a stick , China these days spoons it honey instead. Hundreds of flights a month link the mainland to Taipei. The free-trade agreement with Taiwan signed this summer included measures to help Taiwanese farmers, who tend to support the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) . China has recently hinted that it might one day be willing to point its missiles away from Taiwan.

    For the moment the policy seems to be working. The DPP lost power in 2008. Never mind that its successor, the Kuomintang, is the Chinese Communist Party’s old enemy. Under Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan is being pragmatic . The Taiwanese people appear to want neither to enrage China by seeking independence, nor to want to surrender their democracy to a one-party state.

    This is just fine with America. Its arms sales to Taiwan continue, but it could just about live with a single China so long as unification came about peacefully. What it could not abide would be unification by force. Strictly, the Taiwan Relations act of 1979 does not compel America to come to Taiwan’s aid. However, barring egregious provocation of China by Taiwan, America would have little choice but to intervene. If America just stood by , it would lose the trust of its allies across the world.

    Taiwan remains a flashpoint . Taiwanese democracy could lead to a desire for independence, Chinese nationalism could make reunification more urgent, and America could be afraid of appearing weak. Even now, when the mood is good, the island is a test of Chinese and American restraint . America needs to be clear that it will not be manipulated : Taiwan cannot rashly bid for independence on the assumption that America will protect it. China needs to understand that coercion would destroy its credentials with the rest of the world. America does not expect China to renounce its aims; it does expect China to satisfy them within the system.

    Policymakers often sneer at diplomats for their compromises and half-truths . Yet the high calling of diplomacy is to find antidotes to the rivalries that poison geopolitics . Not since the 19th century have they had as great a task as managing the relationship between China and America. In Mr Obama’s administration they have a name for this: “strategic reassurance”

  • 2010-12-09

    Brushwood and gall - [转载]

    China insists that its growing military and diplomatic clout pose no threat. The rest of the world, and particularly America, is not so sure, says Edward Carr

    IN 492BC, at the end of the “Spring and Autumn ” period in Chinese history, Goujian, the king of Yue in modern Zhejiang, was taken prisoner after a disastrous campaign against King Fuchai, his neighbour to the north. Goujian was put to work in the royal stables where he bore his captivity with such dignity that he gradually won Fuchai’s respect. After a few years Fuchai let him return home as his vassal .

    Goujian never forgot his humiliation. He slept on brushwood and hung a gall bladder in his room, licking it daily to feed his appetite for revenge. Yue appeared loyal, but its gifts of craftsmen and timber tempted Fuchai to build palaces and towers even though the extravagance ensnared him in debt. Goujian distracted him with Yue’s most beautiful women, bribed his officials and bought enough grain to empty his granaries . Meanwhile, as Fuchai’s kingdom declined, Yue grew rich and raised a new army.

    Goujian bided his time for eight long years. By 482BC, confident of his superiority, he set off north with almost 50,000 warriors. Over several campaigns they put Fuchai and his kingdom to the sword.

    The king who slept on brushwood and tasted gall is as familiar to Chinese as King Alfred and his cakes are to Britons, or George Washington and the cherry tree are to Americans. In the early 20th century he became a symbol of resistance against the treaty port s, foreign concessions and the years of colonial humiliation.

    Taken like that , the parable of Goujian sums up what some people find alarming about China’s rise as a superpower today. Ever since Deng Xiaoping set about reforming the economy in 1978, China has talked peace. Still militarily and economically too weak to challenge America, it has concentrated on getting richer. Even as China has grown in power and rebuilt its armed forces, the West and Japan have run up debts and sold it their technology. China has been patient, but the day when it can once again start to impose its will is drawing near .

    However, Goujian’s story has another reading , too. Paul Cohen, a Harvard scholar who has written about the king, explains that the Chinese today see him as an example of perseverance and dedication. Students are told that if they want to succeed they must be like King Goujian, sleeping on brushwood and tasting gall—that great accomplishments come only with sacrifice and unyielding purpose. This Goujian represents self-improvement and dedication, not revenge.

    Which Goujian will 21st-century China follow? Will it broadly fit in with the Western world, as a place where people want nothing more than a chance to succeed and enjoy the rewards of their hard work? Or, as its wealth and power begin to overshadow all but the United States, will China become a threat—an angry country set on avenging past wrongs and forcing others to bend to its will ? China’s choice of role, says Jim Steinberg, America’s deputy secretary of state, is “the great question of our time”. The peace and prosperity of the world depends on which path it takes.

    Some people argue that China is now too enmeshed in globalisation to put the world economy in jeopardy through war or coercion. Trade has brought prosperity. China buys raw materials and components from abroad and sells its wares in foreign markets. It holds $2.6 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves. Why should it pull down the system that has served it so well?

    But that is too sanguine . In the past integration has sometimes gone before conflagration . Europe went up in flames in 1914 even though Germany was Britain’s second-largest export market and Britain was Germany’s largest. Japan got rich and fell in with the European powers before it brutally set about colonising Asia.

    Others go to the opposite extreme , arguing that China and America are condemned to be enemies. Ever since Sparta led the Peloponnesian League against Athens , they say, declining powers have failed to give way fast enough to satisfy rising powers. As China’s economic and military strength increase, so will its sense of entitlement and its ambition. In the end patience will run out , because America will not willingly surrender leadership.


    Reasons for optimism

    But that is too bleak . China clings to i ts territorial claims—over Taiwan, the South China Sea, various islands and with India. Yet, unlike the great powers before 1945, China is not looking for new colonies. And unlike the Soviet Union, China does not have an ideology to export. In fact, America’s liberal idealism is far more potent than token Communism, warmed-up Confucianism or anything else that China has to offer. When two countries have nuclear weapons, a war may not be worth fighting.

    In the real world the dealings between rising and declining powers are not straightforward. Twice Britain feared that continental Europe would be dominated by an expansionary Germany and twice it went to war. Yet when America took world leadership from Britain, the two remained constant allies. After the second world war Japan and Germany rose from the ashes to become the world’s second- and third-largest economies, without a whisper of a political challenge to the United States.

    International-relations theorists have devoted much thought to the passing of empires. The insight of “power-transition theory” is that satisfied powers, such as post-war Germany and Japan, do not challenge the world order when they rise. But dissatisfied ones, such as pre-war Germany and Japan, conclude that the system shaped and maintained by the incumbent powers is rigged against them. In the anarchic arena of geopolitics they believe that they will be denied what is rightfully theirs unless they enforce their claim .

    So for most of the past decade the two great powers edged t oward s what David Lampton, a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, calls a double wager . China would broadly fall in with America’s post-war order, betting that the rest of the world, eager for China’s help and its markets, would allow it to grow richer and more powerful. America would not seek to prevent this rise, betting that prosperity would eventually turn China into one of the system’s supporters—a “responsible stakeholder ” in the language of Robert Zoellick, a deputy secretary of state under George Bush junior and now president of the World Bank.

    For much of the past decade, barring the odd tiff , the wager worked. Before 2001 China and America fell out over Taiwan, the American bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade and a fatal mid-air collision between an American EP3 spy plane and a Chinese fighter . Many commentators back then thought that America and China were on a dangerous course , but Chinese and American leaders did not pursue it. Since then America has been busy with the war on terror and has sought plain dealing with China. American companies enjoyed decent access to Chinese markets. China lent the American government huge amounts of money.

    This suited China, which concluded long ago that the best way to build its “comprehensive national power” was through economic growth. According to its analysis, articulated in a series of white papers and speeches in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the country needed a “New Security Concept”. Growth demanded stability, which in turn required that China’s neighbours did not feel threatened.

    To reassure them, China started to join the international organisations it had once shunned. As well as earning it credentials as a good citizen, this was also a safe way to counter American influence. China led the six-party talks designed to curb North Korea’s nuclear programme. The government signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and by and large stopped proliferating weapons (though proliferation by rogue Chinese companies continued). It sent people on UN peacekeeping operations, supplying more of them than any other permanent member of the security council or any NATO country.

    Inevitably, there were still disputes and differences. But diplomats, policymakers and academics allowed themselves to believe that, in the nuclear age, China might just emerge peacefully as a new superpower. However, that confidence has recently softened . In the past few months China has fallen out with Japan over a fishing boat that rammed at least one if not two Japanese coastguard vessels off what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese the Diaoyu Islands.

    Earlier, China failed to back South Korea over the sinking of a Korean navy corvette with the loss of 46 crew—even though an international panel had concluded that the Cheonan was attacked by a North Korean submarine. When America and South Korea reacted to the sinking by planning joint exercises in the Yellow Sea, China objected and got one of them moved eastward, to the Sea of Japan. And when North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month, China was characteristically reluctant to condemn it.

    China has also begun to include territorial claims over large parts of the South China Sea among its six “primary concerns”—new language that has alarmed diplomats. When members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) complained about this in a meeting in Hanoi in the summer, China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, worked himself into a rage: “All of you remember how much of your economic prosperity depends on us,” he reportedly spat back .

    Last year a vicious editorial in China’s People’s Daily attacked India after its prime minister, Manmohan Singh, visited disputed territory near Tibet; Barack Obama was shabbily treated, first on a visit to Beijing and later at the climate-change talks in Copenhagen, where a junior Chinese official wagged his finger at the leader of the free world; Chinese vessels have repeatedly harassed American and Japanese naval ships, including the USS John S. McCain and a survey vessel, the USNS Impeccable .

    Such things are perhaps small in themselves, but they matter because of that double bet. America is constantly looking for signs that China is going to welsh on the deal and turn aggressive—and China is looking for signs that America and its allies are going to gang up to stop its rise. Everything is coloured by that strategic mistrust .

    Peering through this lens, China-watchers detect a shift . “The smiling diplomacy is over,” says Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state under George Bush. “China’s aspiration for power is very obvious,” says Yukio Okamoto, a Japanese security expert. Diplomats, talking on condition of anonymity , speak of underlying suspicions and anxiety in their dealings with China. Although day-to-day traffic between American and Chinese government departments flows smoothly, “the strategic mistrust between China and the US continues to deepen ,” says Bonnie Glaser of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

    There is nothing inevitable about this deterioration. Peace still makes sense. China faces huge problems at home. It benefits from American markets and good relations with its neighbours, just as it did in 2001. The Chinese Communist Party and the occupant of the White House, of any political stripe , have more to gain from economic growth than from anything else .

    China’s leaders understand this. In November 2003 and February 2004 the Politburo held special sessions on the rise and fall of nations since the 15th century. American policymakers are no less aware that , though a powerful China will be hard to cope with, a dissatisfied and powerful China would be impossible.

    Now, however, many factors, on many sides, from domestic politics to the fallout from the financial crisis, are conspiring to make relations worse. The risk is not war—for the time being that remains almost unthinkable , if only because it would be so greatly to everyone’s disadvantage. The danger is that the leaders of China and America will over the next decade lay the foundations for a deep antagonism . This is best described by Henry Kissinger.


    The dark side

    Under Richard Nixon, Mr Kissinger created the conditions for 40 years of peace in Asia by seeing that America and China could gain more from working together than from competing. Today Mr Kissinger is worried. Speaking in September at a meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, he observed that bringing China into the global order would be even harder than bringing in Germany had been a century ago.

    “It is not an issue of integrating a European-style nation-state, but a full-fledged continental power,” he said. “The DNA of both [America and China] could generate a growing adversarial relationship, much as Germany and Britain drifted from friendship to confrontation …Neither Washington nor Beijing has much practice in co-operative relations with equals. Yet their leaders have no more important task than to implement the truths that neither country will ever be able to dominate the other, and that conflict between them would exhaust their societies and undermine the prospects of world peace.”

    Nowhere is the incipient rivalry sharper than between America’s armed forces and their rapidly modernising Chinese counterparts. Globally, American arms remain vastly superior. But in China’s coastal waters they would no longer confer such an easy victory.

  • Speculation about a change in Chinese policy towards North Korea seems at best premature


    THE lecherous old lush is still on the cognac , even if there is sadly no news of the Swedish masseuses . That Kim Jong Il, North Korea’s dictator, has an abiding proclivity for the bottle has now been attested (at second hand ) by a senior member of the Chinese government. But otherwise the American diplomatic cables made public in this week’s WikiLeaks deluge confirm little that was not already known about Mr Kim, or China’s relations with him. They merely add fuel to the blaze of guesswork and gossip that passes for analysis of China-North Korean relations.

    Still, they contain one piece of startling, headline-grabbing conjecture : that China could live with a reunified Korea, controlled by the South. China pays lip service to the idea of Korean unification. In practice it has long seemed ready to put up with almost any misbehaviour by its ally, North Korea, to prevent its collapse and absorption by the American-allied South. Even this year it has refused to condemn the North for the sinking of a South Korean corvette , the Cheonan , in March, the revelation in November of an unknown uranium-enrichment facility, and the shelling that month of a South Korean island.

    In fact the headline version of China’s alleged change of attitude to a takeover by the South distorts the analysis given in February this year by the cable’s source, Chun Yung-woo, who has since become South Korea’s national-security adviser. Mr Chun is quoted as saying merely that two senior Chinese officials were “ready to face the new reality” that North Korea no longer has much value for China as a buffer state. This view, he argued, had gained ground in China since the North’s unneighbourly test of a nuclear bomb near the Chinese border in 2006.

    Other Chinese officials also express frustration and embarrassment at the alliance with North Korea. The bomb test itself had already given China reason to worry about its inept sidekick ’s nuclear dabbling . It has just emerged that a deputy foreign minister, in April last year, compared Mr Kim’s behaviour to that of a “spoiled child”. His tantrums risk war. South Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, faces criticism at home for not having retaliated more robustly to last month’s shelling.

    Then there is the succession. In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping was said to view with distaste the dynastic installation by Kim Il Sung of his callow , hedonistic son as successor. Kim Jong Il’s promotion of the tubby , 20-something unknown, Kim Jong Un, is even more grotesque . Some Chinese bloggers rail against the aid wasted propping up this failing family business.

    Yet in August China’s president, Hu Jintao, abruptly dropped plans to appear at a ceremony in Shenzhen in favour of popping up to north-eastern China to meet the Kims, apparently to give his b lessing to the youngster’s anointing . And in response to the shelling China has, in a sense , backed North Korea. It has called for an emergency meeting to prepare for a resumption of six-party talks, involving America, Japan and Russia as well as China and the two Koreas. America, Japan and South Korea have balked , arguing that to resume before any concession from North Korea would in effect be to reward its aggression.

    There are three possible explanations for China’s extraordinary tolerance of the Kims’ roguery . One is that it has some sympathy for the North’s claim of being the injured party. An international inquiry blaming North Korea did not lay to rest all the conspiracy theories about the sinking of the Cheonan . And North Korea had repeatedly threatened dire reprisals if military exercises in disputed waters near its shore involved live firing , as those in November did. (In joint exercises in the same area this week, American and South Korean forces cancelled live-fire artillery drills .) Even so it is hard to dispute that the North Korean response was, in the words of Shen Dingli, a Chinese scholar, “completely excessive, disproportionate and outrageous”.

    A second explanation is that China’s alliance with North Korea—“as close as lips and teeth”, as the catchphrase has it—gives the Kims special licence . On a trip to Pyongyang last year Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, visited the grave of Mao Anying, a son of Mao Zedong, who died fighting as a Chinese “volunteer” in the Korean war of 1950-53.

    That also seems limp . China’s leaders are not a sentimental lot , and if they cling to an alliance with the North Korean regime it must be because they believe it in China’s interests. Which leaves the suggestion that the officials Mr Chun was quoting were either out of line , telling their interlocutor what he wanted to hear or, perhaps, ahead of their time . Mr Chun himself described a generational shift in Chinese attitudes and noted that the Chinese envoy to the six-country talks on North Korea was, contrary to his hopes, not one of the enlightened sophisticates . Rather it was (and still is) Wu Dawei, an older man, whom he called China’s “most incompetent official”, and the American scribe summed up as “an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard ”. The old guard in China still seems to be running Korea policy.


    Gumption and bile

    Another leaked cable contains an account of a meeting last year between a senior American official and Singapore’s “minister mentor ”, Lee Kuan Yew. He is reported as giving a typically no-nonsense summation of the North Koreans. They are “psychopathic types, with a flabby old chap for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation ”, though the next leader may not have “the gumption or the bile of his father and grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies.” The cable summarises the minister mentor’s view: though China would rather North Korea did not have nukes, it would prefer—even if Japan were also to “ go nuclear” in response —a nuclear North Korea to an American presence on its own border.

  • A head for business, a natural communicator—and a disaster in waiting for the Republicans

    SO WOULD President Sarah Palin have been able to prevent the embarrassment of WikiLeaks? You betcha . “Inexplicable ,” was her first tweeted reaction to the affair: “I recently won in court to stop my book ‘America by Heart’ from being leaked, but US Govt can’t stop WikiLeaks’ treasonous act?”

    Needless to say , the commentators she derides as the “liberal elite” and the “lamestream media” pounced upon this confusion of apples (Mrs Palin won a copyright case) and oranges (the federal government lacks the legal power to silence WikiLeaks) as further evidence, if such were needed, that the former governor of Alaska should never be trusted to lead the free world. They did the same last week, when she said in a radio interview: “Obviously, we gotta stand with our North Korean allies.” Mrs Palin’s occasional flubs make it easy to underestimate her. But opponents who dismiss her as an airhead do so at their peril.

    Consider first her head for business. Mrs Palin has converted her two months of fame as John McCain’s running-mate in 2008 into a global brand and a fast-growing fortune. Her earnings are private, but her first book, “Going Rogue”, was a runaway bestseller and may have netted her $7m or more. Now “America by Heart” is flying off the shelves. She is said to earn about $100,000 per speech, and her multi-year broadcasting deal with Rupert Murdoch’s Fox News reputedly earns her $1m a year. Millions of viewers are now glued to “Sarah Palin’s Alaska”, an air-brushed not-quite-reality television series in which she and her brood cavort with bears and exude familial wholesomeness amid Alaska’s magnificent snowbound panoramas . That is said to be bringing her another $2m for eight episodes.

    Next, there is the politics. However telegenic and sassy she is, not even Mrs Palin could keep this glistening bubble of celebrity permanently aloft if it were not for the speculation that she hopes one day to be president. Here, too, she has shown a deftness of touch that only the most purblind critic would refuse to acknowledge. Her quixotic (at the time many said “flaky ”) decision in the summer of 2009 to resign half-way through her term as governor has been brilliantly vindicated. Though now a private individual, holding no office and not yet formally seeking one, she has made herself one of the most powerful forces in the Republican Party just when its fortunes have rebounded .

    This did not happen by accident. Mrs Palin has rare political qualities. She is bold: she embraced the tea parties well before their impact became obvious. She is innovative: she has perfected the art of using the new social media to reach over the heads of a hostile press. And for all that she lacks the fluency of a Barack Obama, she is a natural communicator. Her Facebook post on “death panelsaltered the national debate on health reform. When she asked “How’s that hopey changey thing working out for ya?”, she encapsulated many people’s doubts about their president. Just one tweet (“Doesn’t it stab you in the heart, as it does ours throughout the heartland ? Peaceful Muslims, pls refudiate ”) galvanise d opposition to the so-called Ground Zero mosque . She helped put ratification of the new START treaty on hold . She even turned the president’s articulateness into a weapon against him. “We need a commander-in-chief , not a professor of law,” she told a tea-party convention in Nashville.


    But can she become president?

    That said, you do not have to underestimate Mrs Palin to recognise that it will be hard for anyone so divisive to win a presidential election. Mr McCain points out that Ronald Reagan, too, was accused of being divisive. But the Gipper was popular among blue-colla r Democrats as well as his own party. In contrast, a recent poll found that the obverse of Mrs Palin’s stellar ratings among Republicans was that only 8% of Democrats had a favourable view of her. Another reported that 34% of Americans saw her “very unfavourably”. She says she can beat Mr Obama, but for as long as those numbers hold nothing would suit him better than for the Republicans to choose her as their nominee for 2012.

    For the present it is her fellow Republicans—those who are seeking the nomination, that is—who have the greater cause for concern, if only because the attention the media lavish on the Sage of Wasilla drown s out their own messages. Nate Silver, a polling guru, notes that her search traffic on Google is 16 times that of Mitt Romney, 14 times Newt Gingrich’s and 87 times Tim Pawlenty’s. Rivals are loth to criticise her lest she accuses them of belonging to the party “establishment”, a high misdemeanour in these tea-driven times. When Barbara Bush, a former first lady, said she hoped the former governor would remain in the Alaska she appears to like so well, Mrs Palin responded immediately by lashing out at the party’s “blue-bloods ”.

    Whether Mrs Palin sincerely believes she can and should be president may not become clear for some time. Because her celebrity and income depend on the idea that she might run, she has every reason not to rule herself out o f the race too soon. Since she is already famous, she does not have to declare early in order to build up the name-recognition that other contenders still lack.

    This suggests that she could keep her party in a state of fevered expectation for months to come. And even if in the end she does not run , she will have an impact on the race’s outcome. In the primaries before the mid-term elections, Republican candidates learnt the value of an approving tweet from the patron saint of the tea-partiers—even though over a third of her picks then failed to win seats in Congress. Joe Scarborough, a television host and former Republican congressman, called this week on the party’s leaders to say in public what they all complain about in private: that she could devastate the Republicans’ cause in 2012. For some reason, none of them wants to speak up first.

  • 2010-12-04

    Routing it right - [转载]

    The survival of the internet’s governing body has come at a price

    PETER DENGATE THRUSH knows a lot about names. A scientist by training, he has much respect for Carl Linnaeus, the 18th-century classifier of plants and animals. But these days Mr Thrush is busy looking after a different taxonomy : internet addresses, or more precisely their suffixes such as “.com” or “.net”. He chairs the board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the closest thing the web has to a governing body. New addresses are more than names, he explains, they are creations.

    ICANN is set to create many new such digital beasts. When the organisation meets for its triannual shindig between December 5th and 10th in Cartagena, Colombia, its board intends to finalise plans to introduce many more “top-level domains”, as these suffixes are called. This follows the worldwide introduction of internet addresses with non-roman characters earlier this year. If the new plans go ahead, ICANN can argue that it has accomplished its main mission: making the domain-name system (DNS ) more competitive and international. For an organisation that seemed doomed from the day it was founded in 1998 because of squabble s over its legitimacy, that is quite a feat .

    To grasp why all this matters, imagine an internet not with one, but several competing address systems: different websites, for instance, could have the same address; and e-mails could get lost. Forestalling such confusion—and thus making sure that the internet remains a universal network—is ICANN’s main job. It oversees the DNS, essentially an address book that maps website names to the long numbers (“IP addresses”) that identify computers on the network. After somebody types, say, www.economist.com into a browser, the DNS reveals the IP address of the computers that host The Economist ’s website.

    Life would be much easier for ICANN if it had only to keep this system running. But since there can be just one such address book, the organisation has become the focal point of all kinds of interests. Registering domain names has become a big business; hundreds of firms offer such services. Trademark holders want to be able to defend their brands online. And governments want a say over what internet addresses can be used. In August, for instance, ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee sent a letter to the organisation’s board requesting a way to flag domains that could “raise national, cultural, geographic, religious and/or linguistic sensitivities or objections .” So much, then, for “.uighur” and “.muhammad”.

    ICANN’s tricky birth has not helped either. It had to be created from sc ratch —under unfavourable circumstances. After the late 1960s the DNS was essentially run by one man: Jon Postel, an American engineer, whom techies called “God”. Yet this form of governance became harder to justify as the internet became more commercial. In 1998 America’s Department of Commerce created ICANN, a non-profit corporation to be headed by Mr Postel, to run the DNS, but he died soon after .

    If the group has found its footing , despite many crises in the ensuing years, it is mainly for two reasons. One is that those toying with the idea of starting their own DNS have realised that they would be worse off. A few years ago, China and Russia left ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee, protesting that the body was too American and failed to defer to national interests. Last year both returned.

    More important, ICANN has adapted, albeit slowly. For much of its life, it was ultimately controlled by the American government. This made sense, given the internet’s history and the fact that most users were American. But as the number of netizens in other countries and particularly in China has grown, the set-up became outdated . Successive reforms have pushed the organisation farther away from direct American control, granting more power to other countries.

    What is more, ICANN has slowly widened the internet’s name space (see chart). It first introduced a dozen new top-level domains, such as “.info” and “.biz”. After much foot-dragging , it earlier this year allowed web addresses in Arabic, Chinese and Cyrillic and plans to do the same with nine other non-roman scripts. And now it intends to accept new top-level domain names at a clip of up to 1,000 annually.

    But giving governments more power has come at a price . For now, websites can purchase addresses in local languages only from national governments. For a site with the word “Tiananmen” in Chinese, one needs to get approval from authorities in China, Taiwan, Singapore or Hong Kong. For “Chechnya ” in Cyrillic, check with the Kremlin . Rebecca MacKinnon, a fellow at the New America Foundation and an expert on China’s internet, reports that Chinese bloggers are already wary of buying domains through China’s state-controlled registrar because they fear censorship.

    Some also think that ICANN’s board still lacks accountability . It is selected by a nominating committee , which is in turn made up of representatives from trade and regional groups. It takes its decisions regardless of what consensus the extensive process for public comment has produced. And Lauren Weinstein, a longtime ICANN critic , says that the plan to introduce thousands of new top-level domains is nothing but a “protection racket ” by the “domain-industrial complex ”, because firms need to buy addresses for their brands in every new domain. And launching new suffixes will not come cheap. The organisation intends to charge $185,000 a time, which could more than treble its budget.

    But for those who have grown tired of such disputes, there is hope. Web addresses should increasingly fade from public view. More and more people now use domain-name shortening services such as bit.ly and econ.st (The Economist ’s such offering). And the naming systems of Facebook and other social networks are becoming more important. Such alternatives may never make ICANN and the DNS obsolete, but they could reduce both to what they ought to be: a mere technicality .

  • 2010-12-04

    Don't do it - [转载]

    The euro is proving horribly costly for some. A break-up would be even worse

    BOND markets have scorned the €85 billion ($113 billion) bail-out offered to Ireland on November 28th. Yields have risen not just for Ireland but for Portugal, Spain, Italy and even Belgium. The euro has fallen—again. As one botched rescue follows another, solemn vows from European Union leaders that a break-up of the single currency is unthinkable and impossible have lost their power to convince. And that is leading many to question whether the euro can survive.

    The case against it is that European citizens can no longer live under its yoke . In Europe’s periphery some are yearning to be spared the years of grinding austerity that may be needed for wages and prices to become competitive. In the German-dominated core they are fed up with paying for other countries’ fecklessness and they fear that, as creditors, they will suffer if the European Central Bank (ECB) inflates away the laggards ’ debts. Deep down lurks the sullen suspicion that this is a drama that the euro zone may be condemned to relive time and again . So why not get out now?


    The rock and the hard place

    Financial history is littered with events that turned from the unthinkable to the inevitable with breathtaking speed: Britain left the gold standard in 1931, Argentina abandoned its dollar peg in January 2002. But a collapse of the euro would bring with it unprecedented technical, economic and political costs (see article ).

    A break-up might happen in one of two ways. One or more weak members (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, perhaps Spain) might leave, presumably to devalue their new currency. Or a fed-up Germany, possibly joined by the Netherlands and Austria, could decide to junk the euro and restore the D-mark, which would then appreciate.

    In either case, the costs would be enormous. For a start , the technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency, reprogramming computers and vending machines, minting coins and printing notes are huge (three years’ preparation was needed for the euro). Any hint that a weak country was about to leave would lead to runs on deposits, further weakening troubled banks. That would result in capital controls and perhaps limits on bank withdrawals, which in turn would strangle commerce. Leavers would be cut off from foreign finance, perhaps for years, further starving their economies of funds.

    The calculation would be only slightly better if the euro escapee were Germany. Again, there would be bank runs in Europe as depositors fled weaker countries, leading to the reintroduction of capital controls . Even if German banks gained deposits, their large euro-zone assets would be marked down : Germany, remember, is the system’s biggest creditor. Lastly, German exporters, having been big beneficiaries of a more stable single currency, would howl at being landed once again with a sharply rising D-mark.

    If the economics of pulling apart the euro look dubious , the politics risks detonating a chain reaction that would threaten the fabric of the single market and the EU itself. The EU and the euro have been Germany’s post-war anchors. If it abandoned the currency, at huge cost, and left the rest of the euro zone to fend for itself, its commitment to the EU would be in serious doubt .

    If a weaker country left, risking not just European banks but also the currency, it would become a pariah exporting its pain to its neighbours. Once capital controls were in place Europe’s financial markets would be in tatters and it would be hard to preserve cross-border European trade. The collapse of the single market, which has done more than anything else to knit Europe together, would threaten the EU itself.

    However much countries may now regret joining the euro, leaving it does not make sense. But the fact that it ought to survive does not mean that it will. And unless Europe’s leaders move further and faster, it might not.


    Salvaging a single currency

    Europe’s leaders have been slow and timid in response to market pressures. Greece and now Ireland have forced them, reluctantly, into bail-outs. Only belatedly have they recognised that some countries are not just in need of bridging loans to tide them over, but may be unable to repay their debts. That means that some pain will have to be inflicted on bondholders.

    This will be easier to achieve now that euro-zone governments have agreed that sovereign-debt issues after 2013 should contain collective-action clauses, which stop hold-out investors blocking deals. The Irish have already imposed “haircuts ” on subordinated-debt holders in their banks, though they were stopped from doing this for senior bondholders (see article ). Such talk is inevitably unpopular in the markets. Yet losses must be possible if investors are to distinguish between sovereign-debt issuers.

    The crisis should also have brought home to weak deficit countries the high cost of their failure to make the reforms to labour and product markets, and to welfare systems, necessary to restore their lost competitiveness. Even if they left the euro, they would have to take such steps to thrive. Within it, reform would not just revive moribund economies, but also create the chance of future growth to safeguard the single currency. Reform would be easier if surplus countries (ie, Germany) did more to boost their own domestic demand.

    Lastly, if the euro is to survive, creditor countries need to give more aid to deficit countries. They could do this directly, or the ECB could provide liquidity to banks or buy up government bonds before they fall too far. It has indicated it may start doing the latter again. Germany hates the idea of more aid to debtor countries (see article )—hence its slowness to accept bail-outs and its determination to penalise bondholders. Its unwillingness to subsidise the weak and profligate is understandable; but the alternative is worse.

    Breaking up the euro is not unthinkable, just very costly. Because they refuse to face up to the possibility that it might happen, Europe’s leaders are failing to take the measures necessary to avert it.

  • 2010-12-01

    They told you so - [转载]

    The glee of Eurosceptics over the euro crisis is unseemly and dangerous

    AMONG historians who think Mao Zedong was mad as well as bad, it is common to cite his stated belief that proper revolutionaries should not fear nuclear war. The Chinese leader memorably shared this view with a 1957 gathering of world communist bosses in Moscow, alarming even that grisly assembly of toughs and killers. True, between a third and a half of the world’s population might be killed in a nuclear conflagration , Mao breezily predicted. But with most survivors living in the socialist block , “imperialism would be razed to the ground ”, and the world would belong to the Reds .

    A similar fervour grips Britain’s right-wing commentariat as they hail what they claim is the imminent collapse of the euro. In the Daily Mail , Daily Telegraph and News of the World , columnists have conceded that the unravelling of the single currency might involve such “messy” events as the bankruptcy of major European banks. But consider the upside , they urged readers. They see David Cameron picking his way through the smoulder ing rubble of Brussels to dictate to shell-shocked Eurocrats the terms of Britain’s future dealings with the European Union. ConservativeHome, an influential website among grassroots Tories, asserted that having warned of the dangers from the beginning, Britain would have “enormous moral authority” in a post-euro Europe, and urged Mr Cameron to plan his demands now.

    The mood among Conservative MPs is less shining-eyed and more sullen . Despite what one MP calls “mild panic” among the whip s, George Osborne, the chancellor of the exchequer , escaped with a light roasting when he told Parliament on November 22nd that Britain would be contributing billions of pounds to a rescue package for Ireland. He would not say how many, perhaps because—once bilateral loans are added to International Monetary Fund and EU transfers—the Treasury fears that Britain’s final liability could end up a couple of billions higher (or, less likely, lower) than the £7 billion ($11 billion) widely reported.

    True, Mr Osborne faced anger from senior backbenchers about a temporary €60 billion ($75 billion) mechanism for rescuing countries in the euro zone, conjured up by the European Commission in May, to which the outgoing Labour government, in its dying days, committed Britain. The chancellor insisted Britain will not be part of a much larger, permanent EU bail-out fund for the euro zone being debated, and vowed to seek the winding-down of the temporary mechanism. Only John Redwood, a former cabinet minister and a bit of a lone voice on the right, asked for a pledge that Britain would not make further loans to euro-zone members. The chancellor dodged the question. Yet if the crisis deepens it will be asked again, and not just by Mr Redwood.

    Make no mistake, this is the most Eurosceptic Conservative Party ever, says a party elder. In the unlikely event that Tory MPs were given a free vote on British membership of the EU, he says, more than half might choose to leave; the 150-odd Conservative MPs elected at the last election are “very Eurosceptic”, and not just because Euro-enthusiasm is a bar to selection as a Tory candidate. The leadership is Eurosceptic too. Gone are the days when Margaret Thatcher was constrained by pro- European big beasts in the cabinet, whose resignation she could ill afford. Emotionally, it is said, Mr Cameron and Mr Osborne would prefer a looser union based on free trade. They do not pursue such a union only because they believe one is not on offer —and that “banging on” about Europe is electoral poison.

    To what extent is the government’s freedom of action over the euro crisis restrained by Tory Euroscepticism? Mainstream Conservative MPs are less keen than party activists (or their cheerleaders in the press) to see a nuclear blow-up of the euro. But they do not see the defence of the single currency as a British responsibility. Portugal and Spain are “the euro zone’s problem”, says that party elder . Whether those MPs even see the survival of the euro zone itself as in Britain’s national interests is untested . Mr Osborne has presented Ireland’s debacle as a threat to those interests, describing a “friend in need” whose banks are interwoven with Britain’s, which shares a land border and buys more British exports than Brazil, Russia, China and India put together.

    Britain was right to shun the euro, Mr Osborne said, but “I told you so” does not “amount to an economic policy”. Several English Tories proved that “I told you so” makes for terrible diplomacy, too—drawling invitations for Ireland to hurry back to currency union with the pound. One chortled about Ireland being “faithful to sterling” rather than the “more flighty euro”.


    And dangerous to know

    Broadly though, Conservative leaders are lucky that Ireland, a close neighbour, is the country needing help. And coalition with the (more pro-European) Liberal Democrats reduces the power of Tory rebels, who lack a single, charismatic leader. In another piece of luck, the €60 billion EU mechanism involving Britain—the biggest driver of Tory anger—will probably be exhausted by bailing out Ireland and Portugal (whose rescue seems inevitable), before Spain needs saving.

    But a Spanish collapse would take the euro zone’s ills to a new level. Amid a global meltdown, perhaps Tories would forget their bluster and agree that British interests would not be served by standing aloof and watching Spain’s reduction to economic rubble . After all, careful explanations from Mr Osborne convinced most Tories that Ireland’s collapse was not in British interests. The real shock is that his party needed help seeing that.

    This is the political lesson of the euro drama to date. Tory distrust of Europe has injected zealotry into what was once a pro-business party famed for its pragmatism . This is already pretty bad: let not Europe’s spiralling crisis make the Tory party mad.

  • 2010-11-30

    WHICH - [问答]

    I am confused about the GRAMMAR here!?

    Someone told me "I applied an university in UK RANKED 20th" is wrong, I understood.
    Now I wonder does it make sense to say "I applied an university in UK, WHICH IS RANKED 20th"?

    ======================================…
    IF NOT, how to explain the "WHICH" part of the following sentence i read on economist.com?

    So far, little concrete evidence has emerged of wrongdoing by Inite. But the fact that the members of the electoral council overseeing the vote were chosen by Mr Préval has invited suspicion—as has the lavishness of the party’s campaign for Mr Celestin, WHICH blanketed the country with his smiling, confident mug on billboards, banners and leaflets dropped from airplanes.

    Here "for Mr Celestin" fall between CAMPAIGN and WHICH, why?
    ==============================================================
    I will try to help:

    In your sentence:
    1. The sentence should be "I applied TO A university in THE UK, which is ranked 20th" (capitals for TO, A and THE used to make it clearer).
    2. You would usually give the context of the ranking - as in "in the country", "in Europe", "in the world", etc.
    3. It would be ok to say "I applied to a university in the UK, ranked 20th in the ... "(wherever it is ranked 20th). The "which is" isn't needed if the "qualifier " is provided.
    4. It is "a university", not "an university", because the word starts with a "yu" sound (as in "you") which is a consonant sound, not a vowel sound (as in "umbrella").
    5. You apply TO a university. To apply (something) is used for applying make-up (for example), or plaster - in other words, something that you apply to something else (make-up to face; plaster to cut / wall).

    In your example about Mr Celestin's campaign:
    1. The party's campaign was for Mr Celestin.
    2. The campaign blanketed the country with his smiling confident mug (face) ...
    3. The use of the word "which" is needed to make clear what blanketed the country - the campaign which blanketed the country, rather than the campaign which failed (for example).

    More information on the use of the word "which" is available here: http://www.worldwidewords.org/articles/w…

    Hope this helps!
  • 2010-11-28

    Milgram experiment - [转载]

    The Milgram experiment on obedience to authority figures was a series of social psychology experiments conducted by Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram , which measured the willingness of study participants to obey an authority figure who instructed them to perform acts that conflicted with their personal conscience . Milgram first described his research in 1963 in an article published in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology ,[ 1] and later discussed his findings in greater depth in his 1974 book, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View . [ 2]

    The experiments began in July 1961, three months after the start of the trial of German Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem . Milgram devised his psychological study to answer the question: "Was it that Eichmann and his accomplices in the Holocaust had mutual intent, in at least with regard to the goals of the Holocaust?" In other words, "Was there a mutual sense of morality among those involved?" Milgram's testing suggested that it could have been that the millions of accomplices were merely following orders, despite violating their deepest moral beliefs.

     

    The subject was given the title teacher, and the confederate, learner. The participants drew slips of paper to 'determine' their roles. Unknown to them, both slips said "teacher", and the actor claimed to have the slip that read "learner", thus guaranteeing that the participant would always be the "teacher". At this point, the "teacher" and "learner" were separated into different rooms where they could communicate but not see each other. In one version of the experiment, the confederate was sure to mention to the participant that he had a heart condition .[ 1]

    The "teacher" was given an electric shock from the electro-shock generator as a sample of the shock that the "learner" would supposedly receive during the experiment. The "teacher" was then given a list of word pairs which he was to teach the learner. The teacher began by reading the list of word pairs to the learner. The teacher would then read the first word of each pair and read four possible answers. The learner would press a button to indicate his response. If the answer was incorrect, the teacher would administer a shock to the learner, with the voltage increasing in 15-volt increments for each wrong answer. If correct, the teacher would read the next word pair.[ 1]

    The subjects believed that for each wrong answer, the learner was receiving actual shocks. In reality, there were no shocks. After the confederate was separated from the subject, the confederate set up a tape recorder integrated with the electro-shock generator, which played pre-recorded sounds for each shock level. After a number of voltage level increases, the actor started to bang on the wall that separated him from the subject. After several times banging on the wall and complaining about his heart condition, all responses by the learner would cease.[ 1]

    At this point, many people indicated their desire to stop the experiment and check on the learner. Some test subjects paused at 135 volts and began to question the purpose of the experiment. Most continued after being assured that they would not be held responsible. A few subjects began to laugh nervously or exhibit other signs of extreme stress once they heard the screams of pain coming from the learner.[ 1]

    If at any time the subject indicated his desire to halt the experiment, he was given a succession of verbal prods by the experimenter, in this order:[ 1]

    1. Please continue .
    2. The experiment requires that you continue .
    3. It is absolutely essential that you continue .
    4. You have no other choice, you must go on.

    If the subject still wished to stop after all four successive verbal prods, the experiment was halted. Otherwise, it was halted after the subject had given the maximum 450-volt shock three times in succession.[ 1]

    [edit ] Results

    Before conducting the experiment, Milgram polled fourteen Yale University senior-year psychology majors as to what they thought would be the results. All of the poll respondents believed that only a few (average 3 out of 100) would be prepared to inflict the maximum voltage. Milgram also informally polled his colleagues and found that they, too, believed very few subjects would progress beyond a very strong shock.[ 1]

    In Milgram's first set of experiments, 65 percent (26 of 40)[ 1] of experiment participants administered the experiment's final massive 450-volt shock, though many were very uncomfortable doing so; at some point, every participant paused and questioned the experiment, some said they would refund the money they were paid for participating in the experiment. Only one participant steadfastly refused to administer shocks below the 300-volt level.[ 1]

    Milgram summarized the experiment in his 1974 article, "The Perils of Obedience", writing:

    The legal and philosophic aspects of obedience are of enormous importance, but they say very little about how most people behave in concrete situations. I set up a simple experiment at Yale University to test how much pain an ordinary citizen would inflict on another person simply because he was ordered to by an experimental scientist. Stark authority was pitted against the subjects' [participants'] strongest moral imperatives against hurting others, and, with the subjects' [participants'] ears ringing with the screams of the victims, authority won more often than not. The extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority constitutes the chief finding of the study and the fact most urgently demanding explanation.

    Ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority.[ 3]

    The original Simulated Shock Generator and Event Recorder, or shock box , is located in the Archives of the History of American Psychology .

    Later, Prof. Milgram and other psychologists performed variations of the experiment throughout the world, with similar results[ 4] although unlike the Yale experiment,[dubious ] resistance to the experimenter was reported anecdotally elsewhere.[ 5] Milgram later investigated the effect of the experiment's locale on obedience levels by holding an experiment in an unregistered, backstreet office in a bustling city, as opposed to at Yale, a respectable university. The level of obedience, "although somewhat reduced, was not significantly lower." What made more of a difference was the proximity of the "learner" and the experimenter. There were also variations tested involving groups.

    Dr. Thomas Blass of the University of Maryland, Baltimore County performed a meta-analysis on the results of repeated performances of the experiment. He found that the percentage of participants who are prepared to inflict fatal voltages remains remarkably constant, 61–66 percent, regardless of time or place.[ 6] [ 7] [verification needed ]

    There is a little-known coda to the Milgram Experiment, reported by Philip Zimbardo : none of the participants who refused to administer the final shocks insisted that the experiment itself be terminated, nor left the room to check the health of the victim without requesting permission to leave, as per Milgram's notes and recollections, when Zimbardo asked him about that point.[ 8]

    Milgram created a documentary film titled Obedience showing the experiment and its results. He also produced a series of five social psychology films, some of which dealt with his experiments.[ 9]

    [edit ] Ethics

    The Milgram Experiment raised questions about the research ethics of scientific experimentation because of the extreme emotional stress and inflicted insight suffered by the participants. In Milgram's defense, 84 percent of former participants surveyed later said they were "glad" or "very glad" to have participated, 15 percent chose neutral responses (92% of all former participants responding).[ 10] Many later wrote expressing thanks. Milgram repeatedly received offers of assistance and requests to join his staff from former participants. Six years later (at the height of the Vietnam War ), one of the participants in the experiment sent correspondence to Milgram, explaining why he was glad to have participated despite the stress:

    While I was a subject in 1964, though I believed that I was hurting someone, I was totally unaware of why I was doing so. Few people ever realize when they are acting according to their own beliefs and when they are meekly submitting to authority… To permit myself to be drafted with the understanding that I am submitting to authority's demand to do something very wrong would make me frightened of myself… I am fully prepared to go to jail if I am not granted Conscientious Objector status. Indeed, it is the only course I could take to be faithful to what I believe. My only hope is that members of my board act equally according to their conscience… [ 11] [ 12]

    The experiments provoked emotional criticism more about the experiment's implications than with experimental ethics. In the journal Jewish Currents , Joseph Dimow, a participant in the 1961 experiment at Yale University, wrote about his early withdrawal as a "teacher," suspicious "that the whole experiment was designed to see if ordinary Americans would obey immoral orders, as many Germans had done during the Nazi period."[ 13] Indeed, that was one of the explicitly-stated goals of the experiments. In the Preface (p. xii) to his book, Obedience to Authority , Milgram wrote: "The question arises as to whether there is any connection between what we have studied in the laboratory and the forms of obedience we so deplored in the Nazi epoch."

    [edit ] Interpretations

    Professor Milgram elaborated two theories explaining his results:

    • The first is the theory of conformism , based on Solomon Asch conformity experiments , describing the fundamental relationship between the group of reference and the individual person. A subject who has neither ability nor expertise to make decisions, especially in a crisis, will leave decision making to the group and its hierarchy. The group is the person's behavioral model.
    • The second is the agentic state theory , wherein, per Milgram, the essence of obedience consists in the fact that a person comes to view himself as the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes, and he therefore no longer sees himself as responsible for his actions. Once this critical shift of viewpoint has occurred in the person, all of the essential features of obedience follow .[ 14]

    [edit ] Alternative interpretations

    In his book Irrational Exuberance , Yale Finance Professor Robert Shiller argues that other factors might be partially able to explain the Milgram Experiments:

    "[People] have learned that when experts tell them something is all right, it probably is, even if it does not seem so. (In fact, it is worth noting that in this case the experimenter was indeed correct: it was all right to continue giving the 'shocks' — even though most of the subjects did not suspect the reason.)"[ 15]

    Milgram himself provides some anecdotal evidence to support this position. In his book, he quotes an exchange between a subject (Mr. Rensaleer) and the experimenter. The subject had just stopped at 255 V, and the experimenter tried to prod him on by saying: "There is no permanent tissue damage." Mr. Rensaleer answers:

    "Yes, but I know what shocks do to you. I’m an electrical engineer, and I have had shocks ... and you get real shook up by them — especially if you know the next one is coming. I’m sorry."[ 16] [ 17]

    Recent variations on Milgram's experiment suggest an interpretation requiring neither obedience nor authority, but suggest that participants suffer learned helplessness , where they feel powerless to control the outcome, and so abdicate their personal responsibility. In a recent experiment using a computer simulation in place of the learner receiving electrical shocks, the participants administering the shocks were aware that the learner was unreal, but still showed the same results.[ 18]

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  • How Americans turn religious diversity into a source of unity—for some

    AT A time when Americans are worried about their crippling political divisions , it is pleasing to report that two social scientists, Robert Putnam of Harvard University and David Campbell of the University of Notre Dame, have just written a book that examines a powerful source of American unity. Perhaps unexpectedly, the unifying force they focus on is religion.

    America’s religiosity has been extensively documented and should surprise no one. It is, Sarah Palin said in her own new book this week, “a prayerful country”. More than eight out of ten Americans say they belong to a religion. More Americans than Iranians (four out of ten) say they attend a religious service nearly once a week or more. What is a surprise—or should be, when you think about it in the way Messrs Putnam and Campbell have—is that religion in America is not more divisive . They argue in “American Grace” (Simon & Schuster) that religion gives Americans a sort of “civic glue, uniting rather than dividing”.

    The unifying impact of religion would not be so puzzling in a country where people were pious but where there was only one dominant religion—Catholic Poland, say. Americans, by contrast, hold intense religious beliefs but belong to many different faiths and denominations. That should in theory produce an explosive combination. So why doesn’t it?

    There are the protections of the constitution, of course. But the authors put much of it down to Aunt Susan. Such is America’s churning diversity that most Americans are intimately acquainted with people of other faiths. Aunt Susan may be a Methodist , and you a Jew, but you know that Aunt Susan deserves a place in heaven anyway. In fact, Susan does not have to be your aunt, because in addition to the Aunt Susan principle the authors have invented the My Friend Al principle. In this case you befriend Al because, say, of a shared interest in beekeeping, and later learn that he is an evangelical Christian. Having an evangelical Christian in your circle of friends makes you warmer than you were before to evangelical Christians. Not only that, befriending someone from another faith makes you warmer to other religions in general.

    This is not just a hunch . Mr Putnam and Mr Campbell administered a questionnaire to a representative sample of thousands of Americans in the summer of 2006, and in the spring and summer of 2007 they went back to question the same people. Sure enough, those whose circles had became more religiously diverse in between the surveys expressed measurably more positive feelings towards other religions.

    Is this web of interlocking personal relationships among people of many different faiths the secret transmission mechanism of religious tolerance in America? One happy feature of modern America is indeed that soaring interfaith marriages over the past century mean that the average person has a good many Aunt Susans. Roughly half of all married Americans today are married to someone who grew up in a different religion from their own. So it is little wonder that when the authors asked their subjects whether a person of a different faith from theirs could find salvation and go to heaven, almost nine out of ten said yes.


    Three blemishes in paradise

    Yet Mr Putnam and Mr Campbell are also careful not to claim too much. About a tenth of Americans are what they call “true believers” holding strong and inflexible views about morality and their own creed’s exclusive pathway to heaven; Aunt Susan is not welcome in their company. Also worrying is the continuing “God gap ” in politics: Americans who are more religious have become Republicans and the more secular have become Democrats. A final blemish on the picture of tolerance is that the circle of those who are tolerated is tightly drawn .

    For example, even though nine out of ten Americans think that people of a different faith can get into heaven, a much smaller proportion think that a Mormon should get into the White House, as Mitt Romney discovered in his 2008 campaign to win the Republican presidential nomination. When the authors asked respondents to rank their feelings about other religions, the resulting scores were highly uneven. Almost everyone said they liked “mainline ” Protestants, Jews and Catholics. Evangelical Protestants liked almost everyone else more than they were liked in return . Mormons liked everyone else, while almost everyone else (except Jews) disliked Mormons. And almost everyone disliked Muslims and Buddhists more than any other group.

    Part of the problem for Muslims and Buddhists in America could be their small number: few Americans have a Muslim relation or a Buddhist friend. But since being few in number has not prevented Jews from eventually becoming the most popular religious group in the nation, this is not a good enough explanation on its own. Osama bin Laden did not help American Muslims by attacking America in Islam’s name, but Mr Putnam and Mr Campbell believe another factor is at work: the fact that Muslims, Buddhists and Mormons do not have a place in what people have come to call America’s Judeo-Christian framework. Tolerance of Jews and Christians only? That is not quite so impressive.

    Worse, anti-Muslim feeling may be growing. In a recent survey the Public Religion Research Institute found that 45% of all Americans, and 67% of Republicans, agreed that the values of Islam were “at odds ” with America’s way of life. Two scholars from the Brookings Institution, E.J. Dionne and William Galston, worried aloud this month that divisions over Islam inside America may now be deeper than they were ten years ago. George Bush tamped down anti-Muslim feeling, but some of today’s Republicans—Newt Gingrich, with his wild crusade against sharia , is a spectacular example—seem intent on stirring it up . What chance does Aunt Susan stand against the demagoguery of fear?

  • The Fed’s latest foray into quantitative easing prompts a Republican backlash

    REPUBLICANS have trumpeted their victory in the mid-term elections as a revolt against big government, from bail-outs to fiscal stimulus. Having made short work of the Democratic Congress, it was inevitable that they would next turn their sights on the Federal Reserve, a perennial target of the wilder-eyed .

    On November 3rd the Fed said it would buy $600 billion-worth of Treasury bonds over the next eight months with newly printed money. This second round of quantitative easing (QE), the Fed hopes, will nudge down long-term interest rates, thus stimulating spending and fending off the threat of deflation.

    Republicans and “tea-party ” activists erupted in criticism. “Cease and desist ,” cried Sarah Palin, a former vice-presidential candidate. “Currency debasement and inflation,” declared a gaggle of conservative economists and commentators in an open letter published as a full-page ad in leading newspapers. Republican leaders in Congress wrote to Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, to express “deep concerns”; and two of their colleagues proposed stripping the Fed of its statutory responsibility to promote growth and employment, leaving it to occupy itself only with controlling inflation.

    At first blush their complaints are perplexing . Core inflation (excluding food and energy) was just 0.6% in the year to October, the lowest since records began in 1957. Even food prices are up only 1.4% from a year earlier, while petrol prices are well below their peak of 2008. In a Gallup poll , 33% of respondents called unemployment the most important problem facing the country; just 1% picked inflation. Even the dollar’s recent drop is small beer .

    Yet the fight is not ultimately over numbers, but ideology. To be sure, the Fed’s reputation has suffered among Americans of all political s tripes over its failure to prevent the crisis and its bail-outs of banks. But the tea-party movement holds it in particularly low regard , seeing it as the monetary bedfellow of the hated stimulus and bail-outs. Some 60% of tea-party activists want the Fed abolished or overhauled, according to a Bloomberg poll. One of the movement’s heroes is Ron Paul, a congressman from Texas who wants to scrap the Fed outright and bring back the gold standard. His son Rand, newly elected as a senator from Kentucky, has also been stridently critical. QE can be made to seem sinister: an animated video on YouTube that portrays it as a conspiracy between Goldman Sachs and the Fed to fleece the taxpayer has been viewed over 2m times.

    The ideological content of the backlash should not be overestimated. In 1892 William Jennings Bryan, later the Democratic presidential candidate, declared: “The people of Nebraska are for free silver and I am for free silver. I will look up the arguments later.” Liberals accuse the Republican leadership of likewise concocting an excuse to rally their base against Barack Obama. Indeed, the letter to Mr Bernanke criticises QE2 in much the same language used to oppose fiscal stimulus: as a dampener of business confidence and stability.

    Mr Bernanke, himself a Republican, took office in 2006 hoping to stay out of political debates. That is proving difficult. Interest rates are near zero, and quantitative easing is at best a feeble tool for boosting growth; Mr Bernanke, like many economists, thinks more fiscal stimulus is what is needed now. Some Republicans saw a speech he made to that effect on November 19th as a partisan act. “The politicisation of the Fed has occurred,” says Tom Price, a Republican congressman from Georgia and sponsor of a bill that would remove full employment as one of the Fed’s goals. “The problem is it’s been on the administration’s side and not on the congressional side. We’ve got a Federal Reserve that is in essence monetising the debt and encouraging more deficit spending.”

    These broadsides are less threatening to the Fed’s independence than they appear. Senate Democrats could block , and Mr Obama could veto , any change to the Fed’s mandate . And besides, the Fed’s expanded mandate of 1977, to promote “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” has never made much economic sense, since the only thing the Fed can really affect is inflation. In practice it behaves much like central banks, for whom controlling inflation is the only mandate . A simpler mandate would actually fit with Mr Bernanke’s own desire for a numerical inflation target, probably 2%.

    Republicans can make Mr Bernanke’s life difficult with hostile oversight hearings ; ominously Mr (Ron) Paul will become chairman of the House subcommittee on monetary policy next year. But most analysts still expect the latest round of QE to be completed as planned.

    A bigger question is whether the Fed will engage in any further QE if the economy stays weak. There the greatest obstacle is growing unease within the Fed itself. Tom Hoenig, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, has recently stepped up his criticism, calling QE a “bargain with the devil”. On November 8th Kevin Warsh, a Fed governor who has long been Mr Bernanke’s most loyal ally, questioned the wisdom of QE in a Wall Street Journal article. Several other QE sceptics will get votes on the Fed’s main policy committee next year.

    Mr Bernanke may plan to stay the course , but the chorus of criticism is already doing damage. It has nourished investors’ doubts that the Fed will finish, much less add to, the planned $600 billion in bond purchases. That has helped drive up long-term bond yields from 2.53% the day after the Fed’s announcement to 2.8% now, precisely the opposite of what QE was meant to achieve. If those perceptions stick , QE will be seen to have failed and the critics will have won. Unfortunately, the same will not be true of the economy.

  • Only by persuading China that it’s in its own interest to rein in the Kims

    IF EVER a ruling elite seemed to justify the Bush-era doctrine of “pre-emption”, it is the Kim dynasty in North Korea. No government anywhere subjects its own people to such a barbarous regime of fear, repression and hunger. And the Kims are complicit in international outrages ranging from murderous terrorism and nuclear proliferation to drug-smuggling and currency-counterfeiting. The present dictator, Kim Jong Il, is apparently not long for this world, and seems to be boosting his 27-year-old son and anointed successor as a victorious warrior. When the elder Kim was himself dauphin , in the 1980s, he earned his spurs through international terrorism.

    This week the North waged war for the second time this year with South Korea when it shelled a South Korean island near the disputed maritime boundary, killing two soldiers and two civilians, injuring others and burning a score of houses. In March, when one of its torpedoes sank the Cheonan , a naval vessel, killing 46, North Korea could, albeit implausibly, deny culpability . This time, though the North describes its aggression as retaliation (for a harmless South Korean military exercise), there is no gainsaying its responsibility for one of the most serious incidents since the end of the Korean war in 1953. To add to this dismal catalogue , the latest onslaught came just three days after the revelation that, in defiance of international efforts to curb its nuclear programme, North Korea has developed a sophisticated facility for enriching uranium. That gives it a further potential source of material for bombmaking.


    Don’t shoot back

    The starting-point for answering the North’s aggression has to be that, in the most basic sense, the Kims will almost certainly get away with only a symbolic return of fire. It is entirely wrong for North Korea to act as it does. But punitive military reprisals against the North risk a spiral of escalation and catastrophic war. Deterrence works badly against a dictator who blithely imposes famine and gulags on his people during peacetime. Even if there are doubts about the efficacy of its tiny nuclear arsenal, North Korea has enough men under arms, and enough conventional ammunition within range of Seoul—just 35 miles (60km) from the frontier—to make war seem very much a last resort.

    If war and the threat of war are hardly even options, what can the world do? The best card in a bad hand is to heal the divisions among other countries about how to handle North Korea. That means, in particular, making China see that a tinderbox it has long regarded as a strategic asset has become an appalling liability. China also struggles to control North Korea. But a united front would change the environment that encourages the rogue state’s bad behaviour.

    China cannot be blind to the Kims’ bungling and bellicosity , nor welcome their nuclear ambitions. But it has had two worse fears. One is of a rekindled war on the peninsula, which would damage China. The other is of North Korean collapse, with millions of desperate refugees pouring into China and South Korea or even American troops on China’s border. It is as a bulwark against this “instability” that China cossets the Kims. It refused to condemn them even for the sinking of the Cheonan , and this week issued blandly even-handed calls for restraint . It apparently believes that if their only ally abandons them, the Kims might do something really rash .

    But they already have. Whatever it says publicly, China must surely see that this regime flirts with war as an instrument of diplomacy and that its desire to shock the world into negotiating with it requires ever greater outrages. Ultimately, this pattern of behaviour threatens the very stability China craves . China’s alliance with North Korea thus undermines not just its image as a global power but also its own interests.

    So how to nudge China in the right direction? One possibility is the revival of the six-party forum, chaired by China and involving Japan and Russia. Talks stalled after North Korea forged ahead with its nuclear programme. The Kims would regard a revival as a victory. But talks will eventually have to resume if North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are to be negotiated down. If they also help persuade China to rein in North Korea, that would be a double benefit.

  • 2009-09-10

    Original sin - [转载]

    China debates whether its richest citizens earned their fortunes fairly

     

    MOST Chinese assume it is something of a mixed blessing to appear in the annual rankings of China’s wealthiest citizens published by Forbes magazine. Early this year a novel with the title “The curse of Forbeswas syndicated in a Chinese magazine before being published as a book. Anyone on the list, its protagonist warns, is “dead meat”. The rankings are widely known as “pig-killing lists”—a reference to the fate the authorities are thought to have in mind for those who appear on them. In a review of the book, Forbes reflects on the fact that many people on its Chinese lists have indeed been detained or arrested, and asks whether “anyone in China is safe from the curse”.

  • Selling Skype may not solve all eBay's troubles

     

    THE what was no surprise, but the who and the how much were. On Tuesday September 1st, eBay, the world’s largest online-auction house, announced that it would sell 65% of Skype, an internet calling service. The buyer was not, as some had predicted, a group of investors pulled together by Skype’s founders (who have abandoned eBay), but another consortium which includes Silver Lake, a private-equity fund, and a venture-capital firm started recently by Marc Andreessen of Netscape fame. And the price was higher than expected. The stake will cost $1.9 billion in cash, implying that the firm is worth $2.75 billion.

    The deal puts an end to a marriage that will be remembered as one of the more ill-fated dotcom pairings. In 2005 eBay bought Skype, which a year before had a mere $7m in annual revenues, for $2.6 billion. Meg Whitman, then eBay’s chief executive, argued at the time that the service would, among other things, allow the auction site’s buyers and sellers to communicate better and would thus drive business. But these synergies never materialised and in 2007 eBay took a $1.4 billion writedown. Skype would have been better off on its own as well, although its numbers are nothing to sneeze at. The service now has 480m users and brought in $170m in the second quarter—25% more than a year earlier. Recently eBay said Skype’s revenues could reach $1 billion by 2011.

    So the spin-off is good for Skype, but where does it leave eBay? Given the price that the firm extracted for the majority stake in Skype, the original investment no longer looks that bad. And eBay now has some cash for what it must hope will be more successful acquisitions (in April it bought Gmarket, South Korea’s leading e-commerce site, for $1.2 billion).

    But this does not solve what some have called eBay’s “identity crisis”. The firm was one of the three big success stories of the first dotcom boom (the others being Amazon, a big online retailer, and Yahoo!, an equally troubled web portal). Its rapid growth led hasty analysts to forecast that online auctions in general and eBay in particular would take over the world of e-commerce. Some even called for the trustbusters.

    Such predictions now look otherworldly. In recent years, online shoppers have grown tired of bidding to snag deals, which can be time consuming, and have reverted to doing what they do offline: going for brands they trust and buying at a set price. Amazon, for instance, has fared much better in recent years. Add the effects of the recession and it comes as little surprise that eBay had a dismal holiday season and in January reported its first-ever quarterly revenue decline, of 7%.

    Showing better timing than foresight, Ms Whitman (who is now running for governor of California) had already handed over the reins to her anointed successor, John Donahoe, in early 2008. While emphasising eBay’s origins as a marketplace for used and vintage goods, he has since tried to lure back shoppers by turning eBay into a more traditional online retailer. Among other things, he has pushed fixed-price sales and adjusted the site’s search functionality so that bigger merchants with better reputations show up higher in the results list. Although smaller sellers, eBay’s traditional clientele, are up in arms, the changes seem to have stemmed the decline somewhat. After slipping 18% in the first quarter, eBay’s marketplace revenues declined by only 14% in the second to $1.3 billion. Overall revenues were only down 4% to $2.1 billion thanks to PayPal, the firm’s popular payment service. PayPal's revenues grew by 11% to $669m in the second quarter.

    EBay’s turnaround will take time, at least another 18 months, according to Mr Donahoe. He will face pressure to sell off PayPal as well. Eventually the firm will find the right balance between being an online flea market and a more conventional internet-shopping mall. But the shine that once made eBay stand out has faded. This should be a warning for today’s fast-growing internet firms. Sending messages via Twitter or updating one’s Facebook page may be exciting now, just like online bidding was back then. But at some point, when the excitement wears off, users could well turn back to more traditional modes of communication.

  •    1. 英汉旅游词典 867 附录四 水果蔬菜 APPENDIX Ⅳ Fruits and Vegetables FRUITS 水果 apple n.苹果 apricot n.杏 banana n.香蕉 bergamot n.1 佛手柑,香柠檬 2 佛手柑油,香柠檬油 berry n.浆果 △ bayberry 1 杨梅,杨梅属植物 2 月桂果 blackberry 黑莓 blueberry 乌莓,乌饭树 mulberry 桑葚,桑树 strawberry 草莓 cantaloupe n.甜瓜,罗马甜瓜 △ Hami cantaloupe 哈蜜瓜 carambola n.杨桃 cherry n.樱桃, 樱桃树 citron n.香椽 △ finger citron 佛手 c o r e n .果实的心,核心,精髓 crab apple n.海棠果 duria n n.榴莲,榴莲树 fi g n .无花果,无花果树 gale n.香杨梅 g ra p e n .葡萄,葡萄藤
       2. 868 英汉旅游词典 grapefruit n.葡萄柚;沙田柚 greengage n.青梅,青李 guava n.番石榴 h a w n .山楂,山楂果 husk n. (果子的)外壳,外皮 jack-fruit n.波罗蜜,小波罗 kiwi-fruit n.猕猴桃,奇异果 kumquat n.金桔,金柑 lemon n.柠檬 litchi,lichi,lychee n.荔枝 longan n.龙眼 loquat n.枇杷,枇杷树 ma ng o n.芒果,芒果树 m e l o n n .瓜,甜瓜 △ muskmelon 甜瓜,香瓜 water-melon 西瓜 nectarine n.油桃 nut n.坚果 △ betelunt 槟榔 cashew nut 腰果 chestnut 粟子 coconut 椰子 walnut 核桃,胡桃 olive n.1 橄榄,橄榄树 2 橄榄色 orange n.1 橙,柑,桔,橙树,柑树 2 橙色 α. 1 橙色的,2 橙 (柑,桔)的 △ Chinese honey orange 密柑 mandarin orange 桔子 sweet orange 甜橙,广柑 papaya n.木瓜,番木瓜 peach n.1 桃子,桃树 2 桃红色 △ flat peach 蟠桃 honey peach 水蜜桃 pear n.梨
       3. 英汉旅游词典 869  △ sand pear 沙梨 snow pear 雪梨 p e e l n .果皮,蔬菜皮 persimmon n.柿子,柿子树 pineapple n.菠萝,凤梨 plantain n.大蕉 p l u m n .李,梅,洋李 pomegranate n.石榴,石榴树 pomel o n.柚子,文旦 sapodilla n.人心果 sugar-cane n.甘蔗 sweetsop n.蕃荔枝 wampee n.黄皮 VEGETABLES 蔬菜 amaranth n.1 苋菜 2 深紫色,紫红色 arrowhead n.1 慈菇,慈菇属 2 箭头 arrowroot n.1 竹芋,葛 2 竹芋粉,葛粉,藕粉 a r t i c h o k e n .洋蓟,朝鲜蓟(其心可食用) asparagus n.芦笋 aubergine n.1 茄子 2 紫红色 a v o c a d o n .鳄梨(常用于色拉中),鳄梨树 bamboo shoot(sprout)n.竹笋 b e a n n .豆,蚕豆,豆科植物 △ adzuki bean 赤豆 bean pod 豆荚 bean sprout 豆芽菜 bean vermicelli 粉丝 broad bean 蚕豆 kidney bean 云豆(四季豆) lima bean 菜豆 mung bean 绿豆 soybean 大豆,黄豆 soybean milk 豆奶
       4. 870 英汉旅游词典  soybean powder 豆粉 sword bean 刀豆 beancurd n.豆腐 △ deep-fried beancurd 油豆腐 marinated beancurd 香干 pressed beancurd 老豆腐 srmoked beancurd 熏(豆腐)干 beet n.甜菜 △ beet root 甜菜根 beet suger 甜菜糖 broc co li n .花茎甘蓝,绿菜花,西兰花 c a b b a g e n .甘蓝,卷心菜,洋白菜 △ cabbage mustad 芥蓝 Chinese cabbage 大白菜 green cabbage 青菜 savoy cabbage 皱叶甘蓝 calabash n.葫芦瓜 cane shoots n.茭白 c a p s i c u m n .辣椒,柿子椒,辣椒属植物 carrot n.胡萝卜 ca ss av a n.木薯,木薯粉 cauliflower n.花菜,花椰菜 celery n.芹菜,芹属植物 chard n.牛皮菜 Chinese toon leaf n.香春叶 chive n.细香葱 c o l e n .油菜,芸苔,海甘蓝 coriander n.芫荽 crown daisy n.茼蒿 cucumber n.黄瓜 △ bitter cucumber 苦瓜 cuke n.小黄瓜 day-lily bud n.黄花菜 dehydrated vegetable n.脱水蔬菜
       5. 英汉旅游词典 871 eggplant n.茄子 end ive n.苣荬菜,茅菜 fungus n.1 真菌 2 木耳 garland chrysanthemum n.茼嵩 garlic n.蒜 △ garlic shoots 蒜苔 g o u rd n .葫芦,葫芦属植物 △ sponge gourd 丝瓜 wax gourd 冬瓜 koglrabi n.球茎甘蓝 l e e k n .韭葱(洋大葱) △ Chinese leek 韭菜 tender yellowish leek 韭黄 lentil n.小扁豆 lettuce n.生菜,莴苣 lotus root n.藕 mallow n.锦葵属植物 △ Chinese mallow 木耳菜 moyashi n.黄豆芽 mushroom n.1 蘑菇 2 蘑菇 状的东西,蘑菇 云 △ black mushroom 黑菇 dried mushroom 干蘑菇 straw mushroom 草菇 onion n.洋葱 △ Chinese onion 头 spring(或 Welsh)onion 大葱 pa ch yrh izu s n.凉薯,地瓜,豆薯 p a p r i k a ,p a p r i c a n .(匈芽利)红辣椒,辣椒粉 pea n.豌豆 △ common pea 豌豆 cowpea 豇豆 green pea 青豆 peduncle n.菜苔,花梗
       6. 872 英汉旅游词典 pepper n.胡椒 △ belllpepper 灯笼椒 hot pepper 辣椒 pickled vegetable n.咸菜 p o t a t o n .马铃薯,土豆 △ mashed potato 土豆泥 sweet potato 山芋 potato chip 炸土豆片 potherd mustard n.雪里蕻,雪里红 pumpkin n.南瓜 purslane n.马齿苋 radish n.(红或白的)小萝卜 △ horse radish 辣根 pickled radish 酸萝卜 rutabaga n.芫菁甘蓝 scallion n.1 韭葱 2 大葱 seasonal vegetable n.时令蔬菜 shallot n.青葱 spinach n.菠菜 △ water spinach 空心菜 s q u a s h n .笋瓜,西葫芦,倭瓜 taro n.芋头 tomato n.番茄,西红柿 △ tomato paste 番茄酱 tomato sauce 番茄汁 tremella n.银耳 truffle n.块菌,黑蘑菇 turnip n.萝卜 vegetable 1 n.1 植物 2 蔬菜: fresh vegetable 新鲜蔬菜 α 植物 .1 的:vegetable oil 植物油 2 蔬菜的:a vegetable dish 一道蔬菜 water caltrop n.菱角 water chestnut n.荸荠(马蹄) watercress n.西洋菜,豆瓣菜 water dropwort n.水芹
       7. 英汉旅游词典 873 water oat n.茭白 water shield n.莼菜 y a m n .山药,甘薯
       8. 874 英汉旅游词典 附录五 酒水 饮料 APPENDIX Ⅴ Beverage and Drinks AICOHOLIC DRINKS 含洒精饮料: spirits 烈酒 brandy n.白兰地 bourbon n.(美国用玉米制的)波旁威士忌 C a m u s n .甘武士(法国著名白兰地) C h a b o t n .金堡(法国著名白兰地) cognac n.(法国白兰地)干邑 c o g n a c v .s .o .p .干邑 v .s .o .p . Cutty Sark n.顺风威(苏格兰名牌威士忌) D i m p l e n .添宝(苏格兰名牌威士忌) D un hi ll X .O.n .登希路 X .O . F .O .V n .长颈(法 国干邑 ) g i n n .杜松子酒,荷兰酒 H e n n e s s y n .轩尼诗(法国著名白兰地) H i n e X .O .n .御鹿 X .O . Johnnie Walker Black Label n.黑牌 Johnnie Walker Blue Label n.蓝牌 Lou is Roy er X.O .n .路易老爷 X .O . M art el l n .马爹利(法国著名白兰地) Martell Cordon Bleu n.蓝带马爹利 Old Parr n.老伯威(苏格兰名牌威士忌) O t a rd n .金像(法国著名白兰地) Remy Martin n.人头马(法国著名白兰地)
       9. 英汉旅游词典 875 Remy Martin″De Club″n.人头马特级 Remy Martin Louis ⅩⅢ 人头马路易十三 Royal Salute n.皇家礼炮(苏格兰名牌威士忌) r u m n .朗姆酒,兰姆酒(用甘蔗汁制成) rye n.黑麦威士忌 Schnaps n.荷兰杜松子酒;烈酒 Scotch n.苏格兰威士忌酒 whisky n.威士忌酒 vodka n.伏特加酒 Chinese spirits 中国名酒 Chiew Kuai n.酒鬼 Jia Fan Jui n.加饭酒 Jian Nan Chun n.剑南春 . Mi Jiu X O n.特醇米酒 Moutai n.茅台 Wu Jian Pi n.五加皮 Wu Liang Ye n.五粮液 Zhu Ye Qing(或 Bamboo Leaf Wine)n.竹叶青 wine 葡萄酒,果子酒,米酒 b e r r y n .浆果酒(如:草莓,梅,黑醋果,粟酒等) Bordeaux n.波尔多葡萄酒 bubbling wine n.汽酒 Burgundy n.勃艮第葡萄酒 champagne n.香槟酒 cherry n.樱桃酒 c i d e r n .苹果汁,苹果酒 clare t n.红葡萄酒,红酒 cu ra ca o n.橙皮酒,柑香酒 dry wine n.干葡萄酒,无甜昧的葡萄酒 green wine n.(不到一年的)新酒 h o c k n .霍克酒(莱茵河白葡萄酒) li qu eu r n.露酒(一种味浓性烈的餐后甜酒) maraschino n.樱桃酒
      10. 876 英汉旅游词典 mead n.蜂蜜酒 moselle n.莫塞耳葡萄酒 muscatel n.麝香葡萄酒 old wine n.陈酒 perry n.梨子酒 port n. 酒 punch n. (用 果汁 、香料 、茶、酒等 混 和的 )混合 甜 饮料 ,五味 酒, 潘趣酒 red wine n.红葡萄酒 Rhine wine n.莱茵葡萄酒 rice wine n.米酒 riesling n.干白葡萄酒,丽斯苓 sake, saki n.清酒,日本米酒 s he rry n .雪利酒(西班牙等地所产的一种浅黄色或深褐色的葡萄酒) sweet wine n.甜葡萄酒 vermouth n.苦艾酒,味美思酒 white wine n.白葡萄酒 yellow rice wine n.黄酒 beer 啤酒 ale n.淡色啤酒 bitter n.苦味黑啤酒 bock beer n.乔麦啤酒 Budweiser n.白威牌啤酒 canned beer n.听装啤酒 Carsberg n.嘉士伯牌啤酒 Corone n.科隆纳牌啤酒 dark beer n.黑啤酒 d r a u g h t n .干啤酒,轧啤,生啤 Guinnes Stout n.爱尔兰健力士牌啤酒 Heineken n.喜力牌啤酒 Kirin n.麒麟牌啤酒 lager n.德国淡啤酒 malt liquor n.啤酒
      11. 英汉旅游词典 877 Pilsener n.捷克大象淡啤酒 pu rl n.苦艾啤酒,搀有杜松子酒的热啤酒 San Miguel n.生力牌啤酒 Sol n.太阳牌啤酒 stout n.烈性黑啤酒 swipes n. [英国俚语]啤酒(尤指低劣的淡啤酒) Tsing Tao n.青岛牌啤酒 Zhu Jiang n.珠江牌啤酒 cocktail 鸡尾酒: Americano n.亚美的加诺 Around the Wold n.周游列国 B52 n.B52 轰炸机 Black Russian n.黑色俄罗斯 Bloody Mary n.红玛莉 Brandy Alexander n.白兰地亚力山大 Champagne Cocktail n.香槟鸡尾酒 Daiquiri n.得其利,大吉利 Dry matini n.马天尼 Frozen Sunset n.冰雪夕阳 Gimlet n.甘丽 Golden Dream n.黄金梦 Grasshopper n.青草蜢 Jade River n.玉液琼浆 Kir n.欢乐香槟 Long Island Ice Tea n.长岛冰茶 Manhattan n.曼哈顿 Margarita n.万加力 Moonlight n.鹅潭印月 Old-Fashioned n.国色天香 Pimm’s No.1 n .飘仙一号 Pina Colada n.椰林飘香 Pink Lady n.红粉佳人 Pousse Cafe n.色彩缤纷
      12. 878 英汉旅游词典 Pussy Foot n.波斯猫 Rainbow n.彩霞满天 Rusty Nail n.生锈钉 Salty Dog n.咸狗 Screwdriver n.飘飘欲仙,步入佳境 Side Car n.车边 Singapore Sling n.新加坡士林 Snow Ball n.雪球 Swizzle n.碎冰鸡尾酒,四维酒 Tequila Sunrise n.特奇拉旭日 Tom Collins n.汤柯林斯杯 White Swan n.白天鹅 SOFT DRINKS 软饮料(不含酒精饮料) cold non-alcoholic drinks 冷饮 aerated water n.汽水 coca-cola n.可口可乐 Diet Coke n.健怡可乐 Distilled water n.蒸馏水 Evian n.依云矿泉水 Fanta n.芬达 freshly squeezed juice n.鲜榨果汁 fruit punch n.水果潘趣 iced coffee n.冰咖啡 juice n. (水果,蔬菜等 的)汁,液 lemonade n.柠檬水,柠檬汁 lemon tea n.柠檬茶 mineral water n.矿泉水 orangeade n.桔子水,桔子汽水 orange pop n.桔子汽水,橙子汽水 pepsi-cola n.百事可乐 perrier n.巴黎矿泉水 7-up n.七喜 soda water n.苏打水,汽水
      13. 英汉旅游词典 879 sprite n.雪碧 squash n.掺有汽水的果子汁 Sunkist n.新奇士橙汁汽水 Tonic Water n.汤力水 warm non-alcoholic drinks 热饮 black coffee n. (不加牛奶的)黑咖啡 cappuccino n.意式鲜奶咖啡 coffee n.咖啡,咖啡茶 △ coffee mocha 朱古力香滑奶咖啡 decaffeined coffee 去咖啡因的咖啡 Expersso 意式特浓咖啡 Hot Rum Toddy 热林托提 instant coffee 速溶咖啡 Irish coffee 爱尔兰咖啡 Royal coffee 皇室咖啡 milk n.鲜奶 t e a n .茶,茶叶,茶会 △ afternoon tea 午后茶点 black tea 红茶 brick tea 砖茶 Cointeau Tea 橙蜜香茶 Ginseng Tea 人参茶 green tea 绿茶 jasmine tea 茉莉花茶 Oolong tea 乌龙茶 Russian iced tea 俄式冻茶 scented tea 香茶 strong tea 浓茶 weak tea 淡茶
      14. 880 英汉旅游词典 附录六 常用调酒器皿 APPENDIX Ⅵ Basic Mixing Devices
      15. 英汉旅游词典 881 附录七 中餐主食及点心 APPENDIX Ⅶ Chinese Staple Food and Pastry b r e a d n .面包,包子,饼 △ multi-layer steamed bread 千层糕,千层饼 steamed bread[steamed bun]馒头 steamed corn bread 窝窝头 cake n.糕饼 △ crisp cake 酥饼 jujube paste cake 枣泥饼 moon cake 月饼 pea flour cake 豌豆黄 scallion cake 葱油饼 sesame seeds cake 烧饼 c o m p o t e n .蜜饯,果盘,果碟 △ compote of gingko nuts and lotus seeds 白果莲子 compote of gingko nuts with cassia blossoms 桂花白果 compote of silver fungus and lotus seeds 银耳莲心 water-melon compote 西瓜盅 co nge e n.粥,稀饭 △ millet congee[gruel]小米粥 mixed congee 八宝粥 rice congee 大米粥 d u m p l i n g n .汤团,团子,饺[j i a o z i (中文)饺子]
      16. 882 英汉旅游词典  △ dumpling wrapper 饺子皮 lightly fried dumpling 锅贴 rice dumpling wrapped in reed leaves 粽子 shrimp dumpling 虾饺,虾馅饺子 steamed dumpling 蒸饺 steamed dumpling with dough gathered at the top 烧卖 stuffed dumpling 饺子 sweet dumpling made of glutinous rice flour 元宵 j e l l y n .果冻,肉冻,胶冻 △ crab-apple jelly 山楂冻 pineapple in multi-flavoured jelly 菠萝三色冻 water-chestnut jelly 水磨马蹄糕 noodle n.面条 △ noodles with minced pork and winter bamboo shoots 冬笋肉丝 面,疲软浇面 noodles with sesame paste and pea 担担面 noodles with soup 汤面 cold noodles 凉面 fried noodles[chow mein 中文]炒面 instant cup noodles 碗装方便面 instant noodles 方便面,速食面 instant noodles with assorted dices 氽卤面 super noodles 精面条 pancake n.薄煎饼 △ fried shredded pancake 炒饼 thin pancake 烙饼 porridge n.麦片粥,粥 △ rice porridge 稀饭 r i c e n .稻,米,饭 △ broken rice 碎米 cargo rice 糙米 double-crop rice 双季稻 eight-treasure rice pudding 八宝粥 fried rice 炒饭
      17. 英汉旅游词典 883 glutinous rice 糯米 long-shaped rice 籼米 polished rice 精白米 round-shaped rice 粳米 single-crop rice 单季稻 sizzling rice[rice crusts]锅巴 upland rice 早稻 roll n.花卷 △ deep-fried taro roll stuffed with meat 荔埔芋角 fried roll 炸花卷 fried spring roll 炸春卷 frittered crisp spring roll 脆皮春卷 silver-thread roll 银丝卷 spring roll 春卷 spring rolls with shredded chicken 鸡丝春卷 steamed rolls with coconut shreds 椰丝卷 steamed twisted roll 花卷 toffee n.乳脂糖,太妃糖 △ toffee apple 拨丝苹果 toffee banana 拨丝香蕉 Others 其他 almond junket n.杏仁豆腐 chicken puff n.鸡粒千层酥 deep-fried twisted dough sticks 油条 dough n. (揉好的)生面团 durra n.高梁 foxtai millet n.粟,小米 fried ice-cream n.油炸雪糕 green bean puree n.冰箱绿豆沙 g ru el n .粥,薄糊 maize n. [英]玉米,玉蜀黍 maize gruel n.玉米粥 meat pie n.馅饼
      18. 884 英汉旅游词典 millet n.黍,小米 osmanthus sweet lotus root n.桂花糖藕 sachima n.全蛋萨奇马 sorghum n.1 高粱 2 高粱糖浆 steamed stuffed bun n.包子 sweet tender beancurd with mixed fruit n.什果豆腐花 sweet walnut paste n.核桃酪 white fungus in milk n.鲜奶雪耳 won ton [中]馄饨
      19. 英汉旅游词典 885 附录八 西餐主食及甜点 APPENDIX Ⅷ Western Staple Food and Dessert biscuit n.(美 c r a c k e r )饼干 △ almond biscuit 杏仁饼干 assorted biscuit 什锦饼干 condensed biscuit 压缩饼干 bread n.面包 △ bran-bread 麸麦面包 brown bread 黑面包 F r e n c h b r e a d(细长条形)法式面包 gingerbread 姜饼 Italian garlic bread 意式蒜味面包 Italian slipper bread 意式特种面包 rye-bread 裸麦面包 wholemeal bread 粗面粉面包 brioche n.[法]奶油鸡蛋面包,(用奶油、鸡蛋、面粉制成的不加糖 的)松软面包 b u n n .小(圆)果子面包,小(圆)面包 △ plaited bun 瓣形甜面包 burger n.牛肉饼,汉堡包 △ cheese burger 干酪汉堡包 fishburger 鱼馅饼 hamburger 汉堡包
      20. 886 英汉旅游词典 cake n.1 蛋糕 2 饼,糕 △ almond cake 吉仁饼 apple-sour cream cake 酸奶苹果饼 baked honey cake 蜂蜜饼 baked walnut cake 核桃酥 black forest cake 德式黑森林饼 Cappucino cheese cake 咖啡芝士饼 cream cake 奶油蛋糕 Finish tiger cake 芬兰老虎饼 fragrant orange and lemon cake 香橙柠檬饼 fruit cake 水果蛋糕 ginger pear cake 姜汁梨饼 glazed cake 玻璃蛋糕 glutinous rice cake with cocoanut 椰子糯米糕,艾窝窝 haselnut cheese cake 榛子芝士饼 layer cake 多层蛋糕 marble cake 朱古力饼 Norweigian cherry cream cake 挪威樱桃奶油饼 pancake and honey cake 香蜜饼 potato cake 土豆饼 Ricotta cheese cake 利可他芝士饼 shortcake 脆饼,松饼 sponge cake 松软蛋糕 streusel cakes(撒一层以糖、面粉和奶油做成的碎粒的)糕饼 Venetian almond cake 威尼斯式杏仁饼 ce re al n .1 谷类,谷类植物 2 (加工过的)谷类食物,玉米片 c he es e n .奶酪,干酪 compote n.糖煮水果 cookie n.甜饼干 cracker n.饼干 △ soda cracker 苏打饼干 c ro i s s a n t n .[法]新月形面包,牛角面包 c ro u t o n n .油炸面包块,油煎(或烤)的碎面包片 crump et n.烤饼,烤软饼
      21. 英汉旅游词典 887 cu sta rd n.牛奶蛋冻,克司得 d es se rt n .甜品,甜点心 doughnut n.炸面饼圈,炸油圈 entremets n. [法]附加点心,(正菜外的)附加菜 French fries n.炸土豆条 fri t t e r n .(果馅或肉馅)油煎饼 gateau n.糕饼 gingernut n.姜汁饼干 hotdog n.热狗 ice-cream n.冰淇淋 △ chocolate ice-cream 朱古力冰淇淋 chocolate and coconut ice-cream 朱古力 椰子冰淇淋 chocolate and green tea ice-cream 朱古力绿茶冰淇淋 chocolate and orange ice-cream 朱古力桔子冰淇淋 chocolate,rum,raisin and green tea icecream 朱古力朗姆酒提子茶 冰淇淋 coconut,melon and straw berry ice cream 椰子蜜瓜草莓冰淇淋 green tea and orange ice cream 绿茶桔子冰淇淋 lemon,orange and strawberry ice cream 柠檬桔子草莓冰淇淋 orange,cherry and chocolate ice cream with caramel 焦糖朱古力 桔子樱桃冰淇淋 pineapple and mango ice cream 凤梨芒果冰淇淋 taro,coconut and green tea ice cream 芋蓉椰子绿茶冰淇淋 taro,mango and strawberry ice oream 芋蓉芒果草莓冰淇淋 vanilla and orange ice cream with red bean and lotus seed puree 香草桔加豆沙莲蓉冰淇淋 vanilla and pineapple ice cream 香草凤梨冰淇淋 vanilla ice-cream 香草冰淇淋 ice-sucker n.冰棍 jelly n.果冻 △ fruit jelly 果子冻 junke t n.乳冻,乳酥 lasagne n.意式宽面条 △ lasagne egg 意式鸡蛋宽面条
      22. 888 英汉旅游词典  lasagen green 意式素色宽面条 loaf n.1 一条面包,一只面包(通常有规定的重量)2 面包形的菜肴 macaroni n.意式通心面,空心面 meringue n.蛋白酥皮卷 milk skake n.牛奶搅冰淇淋 mousse n.奶油冻 muffin n.松饼,小松糕 oatmeal n.燕麦片,燕麦粥 parfait n.[法]冻糕 pastila n.软果糕 pastry n.面粉制的糕点,一块糕点 pattie,patty n.小馅饼 pe ti t-fou r n.[法]花色小蛋糕 pie n.馅饼 △ apple pie 苹果馅饼 cherry pie 樱桃馅饼 pumpkin pie 南瓜馅饼 pizza n.意大利烘馅饼,比萨饼 popcorn n.玉米花 popsicle n.[美]冰棍 potato chips n.油炸土豆片 pretzel n.脆饼干,椒盐卷饼 pudding n.布丁 △ chocolate pudding with vanilla sauce 朱古力香草布丁 Christmas pudding 圣诞布丁 orange pudding 桔子布丁 Queens pudding 皇后布丁 rice pudding 米饭布丁 rice pudding with cinnamon 葡式玉桂饭布丁 San Francisco bread pudding 三藩市面包布丁 suet pudding 奶油布丁 sultani bread and nut pudding with apricot sauce 面包果仁布丁 Swedish pudding 瑞典布丁 traditional Portugueese pudding 葡式传统布丁
      23. 英汉旅游词典 889  Vienna’s pudding 维也纳布丁 puff n. (奶油)松饼 pumpernickel bread n.粗裸麦面包 rarebit n.奶酪面包片 ravioli n.馄饨饺 △ ravioli de carne[法]肉菜馄饨 ravioli in sour milk,Syrian style 叙利亚饺子 ravioli,Italian style 意式饺子 ravioli mould 水饺模子 ravioli,Russian style 俄式饺子 ravioli served in hot pot 砂锅馄饨 roly-poly n.卷布丁 ru sk n.面包干,法式烤面包 saltine n.奶盐苏打饼干 sandwich n.三明治 △ cheese sandwich 奶酪三明治,火腿三明治 club sandwich 总会三明治(由三层烤面包夹鸡或火鸡肉,生菜,番茄,咸 肉或火腿及蛋黄等做成的三明治) ham and cheese sandwich 火腿芝士三明治 smoked beef sandwich 熏牛肉三明治 tuna fish sandwich 金抡鱼三明治 turkey and pear sandwich 火鸡黄桃三明治 traditional club sandwich 丽廊三明治 schnecke n.[德]蜗牛饼 s o u ff l e n .[法]蛋奶酥 spaghetti n.意式细条实心面 s p i ral e n n .[意]螺旋形短面条 sundae n.圣代 tagliatelle n.意式切面 △ tagliatelle egg 意式鸡蛋切面 tagilatelle green 意式素色切面 t a r t n .1 [英]果馅饼 2 (面上有水果或糖浆的)小烘饼 △ apple tart Alsace style 阿尔沙斯苹果挞 apple tart Normandy style 诺曼第式苹果挞
      24. 890 英汉旅游词典  chocolate tart 朱古力挞 fruit tart 水果挞 lieges style tart 比利时式水果挞 milk tart 鲜奶挞 onion tart 洋葱挞 open tart 果挞 pear and caramel tart 焦糖香梨挞 red berries tart toulorse style 卢斯红樱桃挞 sacher tart 奥地利式沙加饼 t o a s t n .烤面包(片),吐司 △ dark toast 烤焦面包片 medium toast 烤得适中的面包片 toast and jam 吐司加果酱 to rt il la n .[墨]未经发酵的薄玉米饼 △ tortilla chips 油炸的切成小片的薄玉米饼 t r i f l e n .甜糕(一种用蛋白,奶油果酱,糕饼等做成的甜食) w afe r n .威化饼,薄脆饼 waffle n.华夫饼干,蛋奶烘饼 yoghurt n.酸奶

  • 2009-08-25

    When less is more - [转载]

     

    Van der Rohe contemplates simplicity

    WHY is it so many manufacturers cannot leave well alone? They go to great pains to produce exquisite pieces of technology. Then too often, instead of merely honing the rough edges away to perfection, they spoil everything by adding unnecessary bells and whistles and unwarranted girth. In the pursuit of sales, they seem to feel they must continually add further features to keep jaded customers coming back for more. It is as if consumers can’t be trusted to respect the product for what the designers originally intended.

    Occasionally, they get it right. When the little Flip Mino camcorder came out a couple of years ago, your correspondent (not an instinctive early adopter) just knew it was something he had to have. What impressed him about the design was not simply the gadget’s diminutive proportions and low price, but the way the developers had so ruthlessly resisted all the marketing pressure to add further features—and had single-mindedly maintained the design’s clarity of purpose. The Flip had one function, and one only—to fit in a shirt-pocket ready to be flipped out in a trice for those fleeting video moments. This it did brilliantly. Though the Flip’s performance has kept pace with technical improvements, subsequent versions have steadfastly maintained the designer’s original concept.

    Such rigorous lack of feature-creep is rare. Look at what has happened to netbooks—those once-minimalist laptop computers for doing basic online chores while on the hoof. Though palmtop computers and sub-notebooks had been around for decades, a Taiwanese firm called Asus introduced the world to netbooks in 2007 with its ground-breaking Eee PC. The two-pound device had a seven-inch screen, no optical drive or hard drive, and occupied half the space of a typical notebook computer of the day. It had all the essentials (and no unnecessary extras) for doing the job, and could be slipped into a briefcase, handbag or raincoat pocket and hardly noticed.

    Seeing a good thing, rival makers rushed in with me-too versions—each purporting to offer improvements. The original keyboard was only 85% as wide as a full-sized one. Many people thought that just fine, especially as it offered the luxury of a seven-inch screen. For the past 20 years, your itinerant correspondent has cheerfully used palmtops with 62% keyboards and six-inch screens to check his e-mail, surf the web and file stories from odd places. The me-toos, nevertheless, deemed 85% unusable and increased it to 92%.

    With the increase in keyboard width came an increase in the netbook’s screen size, room for a fairly hefty hard-drive, additional ports, a bigger battery—and yet more weight. Today’s netbooks are now the size of low-end laptops, with up to 12-inch screens, 160 gigabyte drives, one or two gigabytes of random-access memory, a video camera, and cellular as well as wireless transceivers. As a result, they now weigh well over three pounds and need a padded case to lug them around. The original concept has been lost in a blizzard of feature-creep.

    Much the same has happened to digital cameras and other electronic toys. Witness the way Canon, Nikon and others, not content with including audio recording in their digital cameras, have now added high-definition video and even built-in projectors as well. Neither are carmakers, despite their long tradition of chiselling away at product costs, immune from feature-creep. The latest version of Honda’s clever little Fit (known in some places as Jazz) is 10% bulkier and beefier than its predecessor. Toyota’s new Highlander is nearly 20% bigger than the right-sized version it replaced.

    Because something can be done does not always mean it should be, though. Back in the 1980s, Richard Gabriel, an expert on Lisp programming, noted that quality in software development does not necessarily increase with functionality. “Worse is better” was the phrase he coined in a seminal essay on Lisp. There comes a point, he argued, where less functionality (“worse”) is a more desirable (“better”) optimisation of usefulness. In other words, a software program that is limited in scope but easy to use is generally better than one that is more comprehensive but harder to use.

    Mr Gabriel’s paradox was really an attack on “bloatware”—in particular, the kind of feature-creep that forced Apple to abandon its Copland operating system and buy NeXT for the Unix software that became Macintosh OS X. In the process, “worse is better” has become one of the pillars of efficient software design and much else. Regrettably, it is not practised as much as it should be. But when it is, the process embodies simplicity, correctness, consistency and completeness.

    To Mr Gabriel, simplicity—in both the internal implementation and the external interface that greets the user—was the most crucial aspect of any design. Although the design should also be as technically correct as possible, if that made things more complicated then any compromise should favour simplicity. Likewise, consistency was important but could also be sacrificed for simplicity’s sake. Finally, the design should cope with as many situations as practical, and certainly all those normally expected. But completeness should always be sacrificed if it jeopardised any of the design’s other qualities.

    This overarching idea of simplicity is what Mies van der Rohe, architect and leader of the Bauhaus movement in Germany during the 1920s, meant by his motto “less is more”. It’s what now, with latter-day eloquence, is called “KISS” (short for “keep it simple, stupid”).

    The idea has actually been around since the 14th century. It is the basis of Occam’s razor as well as Einstein’s maxim that “everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler”. It was the guiding principle of Colin Chapman, the legendary founder of Lotus Cars, who sought to make every component in his featherweight speedsters do the work of two. His dictum “add lightness” has informed every modification your correspondent has made to his superannuated Lotus 74 track car (see “Fly or drive”, March 21st, 2008).

    As an aircraft enthusiast since boyhood, your correspondent has long had a special place in his pantheon of heroes for the poet-aviator Antoine de Saint Exupéry, who pondered the meaning of flight as he ferried mail through the North African night in the 1920s. “Perfection is achieved,” he mused, “not when there is nothing more to add, but when there is nothing left to take away.” How much better the world might be if more of today’s product designers could adhere to such a principle.

  • 2009-08-24

    Friend or foe? - [转载]

    “I AM not a Nazi, I’m not being paid to be here, and I’m not un-American!” The elderly man who uttered those angry words on the afternoon of Monday August 10th was clearly boiling over. He and several hundred others had gathered in a poorly ventilated hall in North Arlington, New Jersey, to berate Steven Rothman, their Democratic congressman, for advocating health reform. The patriotic constituent echoed the sentiments of the angry crowd by declaring that the Democrats’ health plan was something his children and grandchildren simply “can’t afford”.

    With Congress in recess this month, many members are holding such town hall meetings—and meeting a similar reaction. Across the country politicians are being confronted with the outrageous allegation that Democratic reforms will create a rationing bureaucracy of “death panels” to decide who lives and who dies.

    What explains all this? The initial Democratic instinct was to see a dark plot masterminded by conservatives. Mr Rothman recalls encountering such open hostility at public meetings only twice before—during Bill Clinton’s impeachment saga and over the Iraq war—but the difference this time, he insists, is that the complainers are well-organised. A White House official claims that the protests were the result of a “concerted viral whisper campaign”. Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House, went so far as to suggest this week that the tactics used by those disrupting public meetings were “un-American.”

    It is true that e-mails and other documents have surfaced confirming that conservative groups and talk-radio hosts have been fanning the flames of discontent. And prominent Republicans ranging from Newt Gingrich to Sarah Palin have indeed pounced on the issue with glee. The former governor of Alaska even posted a note on her Facebook page claiming that Democratic reforms would somehow do in her handicapped child.

    Look beyond such opportunism, however, and it becomes clear that there is much genuine anger and concern among ordinary people about health reform. For one thing, the punters at these meetings often have poignant and unscripted personal tales that explain their distrust of proposed reforms. Also, numerous polls now confirm that scepticism among Americans at large—and independents in particular—is growing about health reform.

    The Democrats are using two other strategies to try to quell dissent. The high-minded tactic is the White House’s redoubling of efforts to address the concerns of Americans directly. To that end, the administration has set up a new website designed to debunk half-truths and myths and is pouring money into a huge advertising campaign. Mr Obama has also headed out on the road again, with three town hall meetings on health reform planned for this week alone.

    The more underhanded gambit is the decision to bash the insurance industry at every turn. Ms Pelosi now calls its bosses “villains”, while Mr Obama wags a disapproving finger. This will score some political points, as many Americans have a deep (and often well-founded) distrust of health insurers. But the tactic could ultimately hobble or even doom reform. That is because the health insurance lobby may prove to be Mr Obama’s most important friend this year.

    Though it has a shameful history, the insurance industry has done a U-turn of late. It now accepts the need for a radical overhaul of insurance markets through measures such as guaranteed issue of coverage and the creation of health insurance “exchanges”. But its leaders are increasingly unhappy about the shrill attacks. Can Mr Obama continue to bash the insurers one day and rely on them the next?

  • New revelations about an American private-security contractor

     

    AP

    THE “war on terror” has left many blots on America’s reputation—weapons of mass destruction, Abu Ghraib prison, Guantánamo Bay—and one stain continues to darken with time. This week the New York Times reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had once hired Blackwater, a private-security contractor, in connection with a plots to assassinate al-Qaeda operatives. It was the latest in a string of controversial news. This month Erik Prince, Blackwater’s founder and chairman, was accused of facilitating or committing murder. Blackwater released a statement calling the allegations unsubstantiated and offensive”.

    Blackwater is not the only security contractor in the Middle East. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that America spent between $6 billion and $10 billion on the services of these firms from 2003 to 2007. But Blackwater is the most prominent. In 2004 insurgents in Fallujah killed four of its employees, burned their bodies and hung two from a bridge over the Euphrates. The sight of charred American bodies caused uproar at home. Marines stormed Fallujah days later. By 2007 Blackwater was accused of being a perpetrator. The company’s employees opened fire on a busy square in Baghdad, killing 17 Iraqis, claiming they were ambushed. The incident strained America’s relations with Iraq. Blackwater exemplified an American effort gone terribly wrong.

    The latest revelation is that the CIA hired Blackwater in 2004 for a multimillion-dollar plan to locate and kill members of al-Qaeda. In June a horrified Leon Panetta, the new director of the CIA, called an emergency meeting to brief Congress on the programme, which had been kept secret. According to the New York Times, Blackwater helped with training, planning and surveillance. It is unclear whether the CIA intended to use Blackwater to carry out the assassinations—no suspected terrorists were killed under the auspices of the programme. But the scheme adds to doubts over the role of private-security firms in the war and efforts to hold contractors accountable.

    A case in court in Washington, DC, may eventually shed some light on the way the company works. In December 2008 federal prosecutors charged five Blackwater employees with manslaughter for the Baghdad shootings in 2007. A sixth employee has already pleaded guilty.

    In the meantime, Blackwater faces some of the most serious allegations yet. A group of Iraqis, aided by the Centre for Constitutional Rights, a New York-based human-rights pressure group, is suing Blackwater for war crimes, wrongful death and more. In sworn statements submitted for the case on August 3rd, two former employees allege that Mr Prince may have helped to murder at least one person who had divulged, or was about to divulge, damning information to the government. He denies the claims. The affidavits also claim that Mr Prince smuggled weapons into Iraq and that he “views himself as a Christian crusader tasked with eliminating Muslims and the Islamic faith from the globe”.

    With these cases plodding through America’s courts, security contractors continue to work abroad. Blackwater no longer has an operating licence in Iraq—local officials refused to renew it—and the firm has lost a big contract to defend diplomats. But many former employees of Blackwater are now working for the new holder of that contract, Triple Canopy. And Blackwater has rebranded itself as Xe Services.

    As the number of contractors in Afghanistan grows, the mistakes of Iraq may be repeated. Training for Afghanistan’s security contractors is weak and efforts to monitor them are disjointed, according to a report released in June by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, a bipartisan group set up by Congress. Four Xe employees are under investigation for the death of an Afghan man in May. Critics may be gladdened to learn that there is at least some semblance of oversight. The main body charged with supervising contractors in Afghanistan is also a contractor.

  • 2009-07-29

    英国留学攻略 - [转载]

    一、预订机票:

      大家都知道在出国之前第一个要做的就是预定机票,其实这项工作也是很多人容易忽视的,比如说没拿到签证就预定机票觉得比较早,其实不然,如果恰巧在一个高峰期,拿到签证再预定机票,可能就晚了。最好提前一到两个月订好机票,因为通常来讲,较早预定机票,第一:会做的比较从容一些;第二:可以保证你在某一个价位可以拿到很好的机票。很多同学去英国之前如果不注意的话,那么到英国以后有可能是是夜里或者是周末,因为这两个时间段如果你去了的话可能会给你造成不必要的麻烦,因为周末的时候可能学校里的人比较少,是非工作时间,如果你的住宿没有提前安排好,再安排的话可能会比较困难。如果是夜里的话,你本身就比较对英国人生地不熟,你就会感到恐惧,举个例子:我第一次去英国,虽然我到是下午四点半到达机场,当时下着雨,而且特别的大,比较寒冷,原来希望是有个同事来接我的,但是我没有碰到,比较紧张。因为机场太大了,当时我第一次去英国是在1994年,那时候北京的机场还没有那么大,我第一次去那么大一个机场,感觉到有点没着没落的。

    二、安排路线(接机)

    如果你要是自己一个人,你可以这样安排,让学校来接你;或者你在走之前跟学校联系,让他告诉你一个比较好的路线到达学校;或者你拿着学校的电话,这样的话到达目的地就不会有那种特别惊慌的感觉。至于制定哪个路线,那就在于这个学校,如果你拿到签证之后,你就需要去问学校应该怎么走到学校是最经济,最合适的方法,因为在英国机场很多,而且在英国交通也比较发达,有火车,汽车还有飞机,就是算计一下你怎么做,怎么买这个机票是最划算的,比如说如果我出差的话,坐的比较多的是英航,如果坐英航的话,可以从北京到直飞伦敦,通常来讲从伦敦Heathrow机场转机到英国国内任何一站都是免费的。如果你去的城市有机场,你可以直接从英国伦敦机场转机到你要到的地方,从伦敦到目的地你就可以拿到一张免票。你所要去的学校也会告诉你他们离哪个机场最近或者离哪个火车站最近或者离哪个汽车站最近,你了解到这些情况以后,你就可以得到一个最佳的路线。有了这个信息以后再去预订你的机票。

      我们在这里介绍几个有用的地址,第一个地址就是英国旅游局的地址 (British Tourist Authority, Tel: 0044 20 8846 9000, Fax 0044 20 8563 0302, www.visitbritain.com) ,因为在英国这种免费的信息是随处可见的,不光英国旅游局有,比如说临时旅馆或者是旅行路线,观光地图,他们都印成精美册子,你可以免费得到。而且一进机场就有很多的观光图都是免费的。

      这里除了英国的旅游局以外,我们还介绍两个网址:第一个网址是(National Express: [url]www.nationalexpress.co.uk)这个网址是长途汽车网,比如说从伦敦到Surrey很近,也就是20分钟,就可以坐汽车,如果是稍微远一点的行程,就可以找下面这个网址[url]www.railtract.co.uk)
    可以坐火车,在英国火车是很方便的,选择交通工具的时候有汽车,火车,飞机还有地铁,大家在选择的时候最好斟酌一下。汽车存在堵车的问题,因为我第一次到机场就觉得汽车是一个很方便的工具,结果我就上去了,路上都是车,到我下车的时候堵了四个小时。成为了一个非常不好的经历,如果当时有其他的人告诉我还有更好的途径,我可能会去坐地铁,因为地铁非常的快。如果你去其他城市的话,比如说你想准时到达目的地的话可以选择火车,英国的火车非常的发达,它开车的时间是以分钟计算的,可能五分钟以后就是另外一辆火车了。所以这一点跟在中国是有区别的。在中国你可能提前一个小时就会到火车站等这趟火车。然后来了火车以后赶紧抢座,其实这在欧洲是完全没有必要的。在欧洲的你会发现人很少,有一次我从曼彻斯特回伦敦的时候,跑到车站,我看到火车站火车停在那里,火车上没什么人,我问别人这个火车是回伦敦的吗?他说是呀,还不赶紧上去,火车马上就要开了,我问为什么没人呢,他说慢慢会有人的。就是说他们的火车不向咱们的一样,头一站就上满了人,恨不得挤不下,在英国火车上很多空的位子是被人预定的,就是说在英国你提前预定的话就会有座位,一等,二等都是分的。如果你要是观光,只是看看风光,尤其是旅游,你可以做长途汽车,因为国外的汽车都是比较好的带空调那种,而且服务都非常好。所以大家要根据自己的目的,选择交通工具。

      三、费用

    下面给大家说两方面的内容,一个是学费,一个是生活费。不管是大学本科还是硕士,我们国家都是有相关换汇政策的,如果是2000美元以下,可以凭签证,护照,录取通知复印件,到中行北京分行兑换2000美元,如果说你想换2000美元以上的就必须要得到中国外汇管理局的批准,就会复杂一点。有一个地址,在(华通大厦601室。这个地址是北京的,外地的就要到当地的外汇管理局批准。批准了以后,一定要让他批给你电汇,电汇是指不是现钱,就是只挂在你的户头上,是要求你汇到某一个地址,或者是给你汇票,如果是用现金汇款的话银行会收你百分之三的手续费,是非常高的,如果是电汇的话只收你千分之几的,两者区别是非常大的。千万不要批完汇以后就立即兑换成现金,我在这里提醒大家。如果是电汇的话,你不愿意汇到学校去,或者你不愿意汇到你的某个帐户,可向银行申请汇票,带汇票出国是最理想的了。其他的方式如电汇,银行化帐,信用卡。信用卡有两种,一种到英国以后,你自己到英国当地开信用卡或者是其他卡,在中国很多银行,像中行,广东发展银行,工行都开了国际信用卡业务。国际信用卡特别适用于孩子留学,在中国如果你父母开了国际信用卡,你要申请主副卡,父亲拿着主卡,孩子在英国拿着副卡,使用则是同等效应的。关键是父亲每个月都会收到对帐单,也就是说孩子花了多少钱,会一清二楚。

    四、英国货币

      还有一点关于英国货币的情况,因为英国的钞票有100的,20的,10块的,其实真正到了英国以后100块钱是很少见的,通常二十块钱都会让人皱眉头,他们都会认为这是大钱。在英国普遍的消费是用信用卡,信用卡在英国是很普遍的,就是说你在一个很小的超市买一块巧克力都可以刷卡。所以他的信用卡制度非常的方便。这样的话出去你一定要准备一些零钱,例如说10块的,五块的,这种经历我遇到过一次,有一次去机场,我知道带一些零钱,然后我想打个电话,兜里面只有一个五块的,我走到一个人面前说麻烦给我换一些硬币,结果他说楼上有换钱的地方。但是我要带着很多的行李爬电梯很不方便,还要排队。另外在英国排队非常的有规律,不管是去做车还是去看戏,没有一个人上去抢。这是一点,还有一个是爱国这点,其实到了国外以后中国人的自豪感会越来越强的,出去以后,作为一个中国人你是自己一个人,如果你挤车,别人都排队等车,这是不礼貌的。入乡随俗。而且坐车的时候你兜里要随时放着些零钱。

      英国通用的货币是英镑,其他的货币必须兑换成当地的货币才能存起来。

    五、文件资料

      下面比较关键的问题,就是文件资料的问题,这个问题也可以总结成一个小故事,我去的时候也是送一个小孩,他和我一架班机,说是我可以照顾他,当时是三月底,我告诉他要带什么文件,他说都带了,入境的时候要检查,像什么录取通知书,银行文件,他倒都带着呢,带了一个大包,一拉开里面什么东西都有。所以从这个角度来看,我们一定要把这些文件放在一个方便你拿的地方。有的人就拿一个笔记本电脑,装点钱,这可不行。在国外行李也有丢失的,不是放在那里就保险了。所以说贵重物品,尤其是钱这种东西,千万不要放在行李上。

    六、行李

    说一下行李的问题,这也是大家关心的,英国航空公司夏季每周四班(周二、四、六、日) 冬季每周三班 (周二、四、日)由北京直飞伦敦;

    每天数班经伦敦飞往其他主要英国城市(如曼彻斯特`爱丁堡、格拉斯哥等);

    所有飞往英国航班都于当日下午抵达。英航空中机组成员掌握普通话、粤语、及英语:英航华语服务小组会随时在伦敦机场协助您办理出入境、转机及提取行李、预定酒店等事宜。

    独立飞行的年幼乘客会得到英航的专门照顾,直到送抵接机人手中。家人只需预定机位时填妥有关申请表格即可。

      英航在两年之前就推出了学生计划,在北京至伦敦行段上为留学学生提供30KG免费货运行李及6KG手提行李额(包括一台便携式电脑)其中经济舱手提行李除不能超过6KG的重量外,尺寸不应超出55*40*20CMS;随行托运行李以重量为准,不计尺寸、件数。这有一个问题就是你到了英国以后要申请拿你的行李。

    最后一点,英航最近又提供了一个新的计划,这个计划将会慢慢得到同学认可,但是现在还在试验阶段,学生到本科会有三个假期,要往返三年一次,可以在一次出行的时候买三张往返票,一下可便宜1000块甚至更多,这个计划刚推出,如果想了解可以打电话。英航办事处的地点在赛特大厦210房间,电话65124070,75,80,85

     关于手提行李,我列出一个单子,就是关于手提行李应该带些什么东西,一个是入境文件,这些文件包括护照,签证还有飞机降落前发给你的入境卡,这样可以减少你在入境时的时间,还要带支笔,可以填一些资料,还要带一些英镑的现金,还有上飞机之前穿的衣服很重要,我在飞机上看到一些代表团,穿的衣服非常的正式,戴着领带穿着西装非常累,因为在飞机上要飞行10多个小时,要穿一些纯棉的,很舒服的衣服,尽量不要穿的太厚,尤其是夏天如果要是冷的话,没关系,飞机上会有毛毯。如果知道自己有一些小毛病,要带一些需要的治疗用的药,如果医生开了处方,除了要带药,还要带上医生的处方,这样如果你在英国生了这种病,对你现行的治疗有好处,另外一个最重要的就是你最终目的地的联系人的电话,这也是最重要的,下飞机以后不管是干什么有什么问题都可以打电话。

      关于行李,尽可能的不要带太多的行李,我们刚才提到有些有用的东西,还有些没有用的东西,比如有些人可能会带很多的书,书当然是要带的,比如字典,但是不要带很多,另外在海外旅行不要把行李交给陌生人。

    七、物品清单

      下面我讲一下有用物品的清单,相机,所有重要文件的备份,签证,护照必须要复印,录取通知书也要备份,以备以后不小心丢了用,还有至少要带9张护照的照片,因为在国外要办很多的证件,例如学生证各种卡,都要照片,还有双语词典,因人而宜,中药不要带太多,小礼品不要很贵重,最多不要超过100块钱,还有英国常下雨,尤其在海边风还很大,雨衣,防雨的夹克很重要,雨伞不是很结实,英国的插座和中国不一样,上面竖着,下面横着的,最好带适配器,还要讲一下禁带物品,有一些物品不允许带出境,也不允许带入英国境的,例如,麻醉品,仿真武器,真枪就更不能带了,大家可以到263教育网的英国海外生活去看看,如果大家带手提电脑最好带购买发票,因为在入境的时候要申报,证明是自己用的,就不需要上税了。

    八、入境

      讲到入境,到了英国标志系统很健全,跟着标志走就可以了,从北京到英国的航空飞机上有60%的中国公民,不用愁,在飞机上可以结识很多的朋友,入关的时候就不会有问题,转机也可以看到转机标志,行李会自动转机。

      提到入境问题,出国6个月以上的人员都要做体检,在入境是有体检证书会非常快,如果没有做体检,入境时会有快速检查。

      如果入境有问题,第一个联系的是学校,还可以打机场的电话020-88141559还有88349942在伦敦不用拨020-73576917,是入境服务处的电话,会为你解决问题。

      下面说一下英国入境规定,可以免费带的物品:200只香烟、100只小雪茄、2 公升的葡萄酒,60毫升香水,250毫升的花露水,45镑的礼品,17岁以下不能带烟酒入境。

    九、住宿

      有关住宿问题,一般的学校都会提供学生宿舍,并优先安排国际学生第一年的住宿。大部分学校宿舍里都有电脑的接口和电话接口。一般情况下大家共用一些公共设施,如厕所、浴室和厨房等。另外一种条件较好的宿舍有自己独立的卫生间。

      如果不喜欢学校的宿舍,在英国也可以找到一些私人出租的住房。租住私人房子,房主会要求你和他签一个合同,如果是共同租住的话,提醒大家要在入住前把有关费用分摊的方式讲清楚,例如水电费,电话费,取暖费等。

      在出国之前把住宿安排好,对于入关也有帮助。在英国的机场入关时,入境官员会要你出示在英国住宿的相关文件。因此在走之前安排好,不仅使你踏出国门的第一步更加稳妥,而且对入境也有帮助。

    十、登记

      下面讲关于警察局登记的有关规定。可能大家都没有听说过,中国学生在到达英国后的7日内,应到当地警察局办理登记,登记要交登记费,别忘了带上护照和两张护照照片。

    十一、开户和保险

      在英国如何开户和买保险。英国有很多的银行。在不同地区,各个地区有不同的主要银行,在英国比较大的银行有(Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC Bank, Natwest )。学生开户要注意几点,第一要看该银行在你的校园和住处附近有没有营业所。开户以后银行会根据你的情况给你不同的服务,对于短期的学习,比如不足6个月的,可能不会给你支票本。开户时会让你出示你的证件,例如护照,签证,证明居住地址的材料,例如他可能让你出示你给你房东的单据之类的文件。另外各个银行有不同的优惠措施,利率也不同。

      关于保险,如果你在英国学习6个月以上,你就可以享受国家健康中心的免费服务,而无需购买医疗保险。如果不足6个月,你就要考虑自己购买医疗保险。如果你的英国买车,一定要买保险。此外,如有贵重物品,如电脑、手机,也可以买保险以备不测。

    十二、医疗

      医疗可能是大家关心的问题。只要你的签证显示你在英国停留6个月以上,你就可以享受到英国国家医疗计划。我们建议你到校后马上到学校的健康中心注册,注册后你会得到一个医疗卡,凭这张卡,可以在生病时得到医生的免费诊断(处方),但是凭医生的处方拿药是花钱的。另外如果你的医生检查之后认为你病情严重需住院,住院费之后的所有医疗费也是免费的。英国看牙医往往不是免费的。

    十三、学习方法

      关于学习方法的问题。学习方发多种多样,主要有授课、自主学习、小组讨论(课题)和作业。在英国更多依靠的是自主学习,你会有很多的时间由自己支配。建议大家要充分利用图书馆和互联网上的资料。积极参加小组课题的讨论,敢于发表自己的观点,这样不仅有利于学习,也有利于交朋友。作业要求用电脑完成,因此建议对使用电脑不熟悉的同学在走之前要强化训练以下。作业要按时完成,过的老师规定的时间,老师有权拒收,而你就会因此得零分。学习生活中的困难要随时与你的指导老师沟通。

    十四、与家人朋友联系的方法

      A、邮件

      在英国,递送邮件有四种方式:

      1、一等邮件

      一等邮件的标准重量为60克以内。在英国国内递送的邮件,费用为26便士,第二天到达收件人手中。国际邮件的费用为30-60便士。

      2、二等邮件

      标准重量以内(60克)的二等邮件费用为19便士,通常是在2、3天内到达收件人手中。

      3、Recorded delivery:适用于寄送重要文件,发件人可以查询邮件抵达的日期。

      4、Registered post:适用于寄送重要文件,如出现邮件丢失,可以索赔。

      B、电话

     1、公共电话:公共电话比比皆是,分投币和卡式两种。如果是卡式电话,你需要先买个电话卡。英国最著名的电话公司是BT(英国电话公司),但BT的话费较贵。和中国一样,在英国也可以买到各种网络电话卡。网络电话虽然话费便宜,但往往清晰度差,声音滞后,因此要花费更多的通话时间。在唐人街,你可以找到各种电话卡。

      2、学生线

      如果你住学校的宿舍,就可以享受学生线的服务。学生线的优点在于内线通话是免费的,以方便你与同学讨论课题,增进了解;使用外线时也有一定的优惠。但缺点是使用电话卡时也要计费。这样,那些经常要用电话卡打国际长途的学生,就要综合考虑花费和通话质量,作出最佳选择。

      3、手提电话Mobile phones

      在英国购买手提电话非常便宜,有时甚至可以免费得到电话机,但话费较贵。英国最著名的无线通讯商有Vodaphone、BT、One2One、 Virgin和Orange等。他们所提供的服务更是让你眼花缭乱,有包月也有按通话时间计费。在选择手提电话及其服务时,要综合考虑你通话习惯,如通话时间的长短、通话类型(国际、国内、电话卡)、你的朋友用的是哪家电话公司(同一家公司客户间的通话费会低些)等等因素,选择一种适合你的组合(package)。

      4、E-mail:大部分的英国院校会向学生提供免费的e-mail帐户,并有充裕的计算机供学生使用。但学校的计算机通常都设有密码,建议你尽早完成报到注册,取得你的用户名和密码,以便充分利用学校的设施。

      如果学校不提供的e-mail服务,建议你注册免费的e-mail帐户,比如hotmail, yahoo等。

      十五、打工

    如果你是以学生身份取得的签证,在英国期间可以合法打工。打工的时间规定是:学期内每周20小时;假期每周40小时。

      获得打工的信息有以下几种渠道:店门上的告示。如果你看到商店里贴着"help wanted"字样的条子,就说明这里在招工,你可以去问问。此外也可以去学校的职业办公室咨询。每个城市都会有职业中心(job centre ),你也可以从中找到许多招聘信息。留意学校的布告栏或当地报刊杂志,你可以在上面找到有关信息。你还可以把你想打工的信息告诉朋友、房东或同学,他们也许会向你提供线索。

    十六、留英校友的经验:

      首先我要讲一下学习方法问题,英国和中国教育有很大不同,我们怎样适应英国的教育,掌握自己的方法很重要,在英国没有教科书,每学期开学前老师会留下一些课题供大家讨论,在英国教科书非常贵,每本都在25镑~30镑,如果你把所有的书都买下来费用是很可观的,所以建议大家多去图书馆尽量依靠图书馆,多去图书馆,在图书馆里可以找到一些你专业的文章,这些对你会很有帮助。

     另外关于英国的考试,英国有两种考试,一种是open book的考试,这种考试通常在考试前老师会给你一个具体案例,你可以去找与该案例有关的资料,事先准备的资料可以带进考场,考试时间通常为3个小时,这种考试非常紧张,一定要做好充分准备。

      另外一种为闭卷考试,不可以带资料,通常会问10道问题,并规定至少回答几道,学生可以选择你拿手的问题回答。母语非英语的学生可以带字典,但是不能带电子词典。在英国通常50分及格,能考70分则证明你的成绩很优秀。

      最后希望大家能够在英国生活、学习顺利。

  • Airport Sleeping Tips
    How to Sleep in an Airport: 101

    If, for some strange reason, your browser has been acting up again and you ended up on this site (that's how most of our visitors arrive), you may now be curious about this odd idea of sleeping in airports. You are probably asking yourself one (or all) of the following questions: How do I do it? What should I bring with me? What tips do you have to share with us airport sleeping newbies? Well, here are some ideas that will help you get started in your airport sleeping adventures.

    Tips

    1. Always Have a Backup Plan: This is the most important tip for anyone who voluntarily sleeps in airports. Some airport officials are not totally supportive of the airport sleeping idea. Although in 95% of the airports you won't be kicked out, you will be asked why you are there, why you are not in a hotel like normal people and they will ask for proof that you are flying out the next day. So BE PREPARED to answer those questions! They seem to not appreciate us using these massive wastes of space as our personal hotels -- go figure!?!? 

    "Thankfully (and thanks to this site), we were fully prepared to sleep at the airport with our blankies and pillows." -Janet

    2. Expect your flight to be cancelled and be prepared:  If weather or a schedule delay cause you to be stuck in the airport for longer than you had expected, it would have been better to be prepared, wouldn't it?  Your emergency airport survival kit could include: 

    • A cheap inflatable pool raft (they fold up nicely and make the hard floor a lot more comfortable).  Keep in mind that in some airports sleeping on the floor is a no-no.
    • Eye shades and ear plugs
    • Bottled water and snacks (many dining facilities and shops close down at night, so be sure to bring or buy food before the airport shuts down)
    • Books/magazines/diary
    • Personal music device with large headphones.  Place it under your coat/in your pants....whatever turns you on. There have been cases of people waking up with just their headphones, so be sure you don't make it easy for someone to walk off with it. Headphones that cover your ears will help block out loud announcements.
    • An alarm clock or a pen and post-it pad.  If you are travelling solo, write a "Wake me at 5:00 AM" note and stick a few on yourself and the seats around you -- it works.  People will wake you.
    • An airline blanket and/or pillow (borrowed - NOT STOLEN!!!).
    • Disinfectant wipes.  Cleanliness is a problem in some airports, so these handy wipes will make your "bed" for the night a little less germ and grease covered.
    • Tissue/toilet paper.  In some third world airport bathrooms, you will be forced to pay a King's ransom for two single ply sheets of toilet paper.
    • Tipping money if you forgot to pack aforementioned toilet paper
    • Vick's Vapour rub.  Place a dab of this under your nose to block out bad terminal odours. It works for people who work in morgues, so it should work in the airport.
    • Power bar - energy supplies are short in some airports.  You will make friends for life if you bring a multi-outlet power bar to recharge cell phones, laptops and ipods.  Instead of waiting for the other person to finish recharging, whip out the power bar and offer to share the outlet.  Now, the challenge will be finding a live outlet that works.  Airports have made quite the effort deactivating a lot of outlets.  And what's up with the employees who take personal offence to us recharging our electronics.  Does it come out of their salary?  
    • Your camera to document your stay.
    • Entertain yourselves.  A Twister mat and spin card are light and take up little room in your carry on.  Cards always come in handy.  If these are unavailable to you, luggage carts and airport wheelchairs have also brightened a few faces around here.

    "Thanks to a tip from the sleepinginairports website I found the reclining padded wheelchairs and slept in one of them." -BRValentine

    3. Bring something comfortable to sit on: If you have read any of the entries on this site, you'll probably have read about those pesky chairs with the arm handles and curved seats. These seats are not only uncomfortable, but also unfair to airport sleepers' rights (we have a right to be comfortable when we sleep, don't we?)! Not everyone has a sleeping bag with them, so if you have the aforementioned inflatable raft, a towel or something else that is cushiony throw it down on the floor and try that method. In some airports bringing out your sleeping bag is a no no. Remember that if you take advantage of the free lodging too much, the airport officials will "crackdown" on airport sleepers making it more difficult for us to obtain reasonable sleepage.

    4. Get there early:  If you are staying at a busy airport overnight, you'll have to get there early if you want a good spot, especially during the summer season (peak airport sleeping season).  Airports such as London's Stansted are so popular they can look like refugee camps on an average night.  Consider that many people complain of limited seating when they arrive at 10PM. 

    "Thanks for this homepage we found the nice comfortable bench at the restaurant where we spent the night." -kmaja

    5. Scope it out: finding a good spot may be your biggest challenge.  If the situation looks dismal, explore the airport and various terminals (take the terminal shuttles - that's what they are there for). Even if you are flying out of terminal A, you may discover that terminal C has nice digs. Consider seating, temperature, announcements and people traffic when finding the best place to spend the night.  You may need to be creative such as sleeping behind ticket counters, in wheelchairs and on luggage conveyor belts. Your best source of info will be security, airport and airline staff.  If you are nice, these people will likely direct you to a nice spot!  

    6. It's sometimes better to arrive than depart: The Arrivals lounges are often more comfortable than the Departures lounges.  It's amazing how different the two areas can be in some airports.  Of course airport logic seems to be that people who are departing immediately go to their gates, they don't sit around the ticket counters for hours.  While the arrivals lounge aims to make all those family members, who are waiting for your flight to finally arrive after a four hour delay, a little more comfortable until you and your bags finally show up. 

    7. When sleep is Impossible: In Geneva (one of those airports with plastic, arm handle, bucket seat chairs) I could not sleep. There was absolutely NOTHING to do and nobody around to talk to. If I didn't have my journal, walkman (that's how long ago that stay was...the days of the "walkman") and book with me I would have died of boredom. If you bring something to entertain yourself, the night will go faster.  See entertainment ideas listed at the end of item # 2.

    "I arrived at Sea-Tac last night with a printout from this webpage under my arm." -Ray

    8. Act Innocent: Even if you sleep in airports on regular basis -- Do Not Act Like A Professional!!! Act like you REALLY do not want to be there and that there is absolutely nowhere else to go.  I find crying helps.  Remember, in the airport officials' eyes "the airport is not a motel." Ha, little do they know....

    9. Single Travellers Listen Up: Travelling solo can be a pain in the ass, especially when you are an airport sleeper. Remember that in the airports where few, if any, other people camp out in, you will have to take your luggage with you wherever you go. Even though you don't have to worry about people stealing your belongings, you can't just leave your stuff sitting there unattended. If you do you may see the bomb squad taking apart your bag by the time you return from the washroom.  For unexpected overnight stays, did you know that some airports actually have cots and blankets for passenger use?  Ask and you may receive.

    "Thanks to the warnings from your site I organised to visit the Qantas Club which is a haven in an otherwise horrible experience." -Ron

    11. Still bored and can't sleep?  Take photos of the airport to pass the time!!! - Have you seen some of the photos on the sleepinginairport.com blog?  Well, if you haven't, head over there to have a look at some of the fun photos people have sent to me.  These photos may inspire you to try to come up with similar (or better) photos.   PLEASE don't forget to send them to me when you get back. 

    12. Just Park It! - Ok, so whether you are stuck in the airport overnight or choose to be their voluntarily, there may be a chance that you will be uncomfortable and unhappy with your surroundings in the terminal. If you are travelling on a budget and do not want to fork out for one of the airport hotels, head over to the car rentals hall to find out the cost of a car rental and (assuming you can keep the car in the lot at no cost) sleep in the car. The great part about this is that you can recline on padded seats and there will be no annoying security announcements or rattling luggage carts whipping past your head throughout the night. On the negative side, car horns and screeching tires may jolt you from your slumber. Sure the car rental staff may look into your car wondering if you've had a stroke and the bathroom may be an issue depending on the location of the nearest toilet, but hey, you're saving money here! Very important - remember to check the drop-off hours to ensure a staff member will be there when you "drop-off" the car before your flight the next morning! This is easier at larger airports.

    13. Dress for the occasion:  Dress in layers.  Have clothes that will make you comfortable if it is unbearably hot or sub-arctically cold in your airport. We beg of you to please apply deodorant and we recommend you to pack a surgical mask to wear when the travellers around you have not applied deodorant.  The stench from the heat in some airports can be traumatizing.

    14. Dealing with airport bribery: In some airports you will be asked for a bribe just to pass through a metal detector, enter an airport or to use the bathroom.  When approached by the unscrupulous individuals, suddenly speak a new language.  Learn Klingon if a real language doesn't interest you.   Although you understand you are being asked for money, be bubbly and happy, but confused by your tormentor's actions.  When the offender holds out his/her hand for money, thank him, bow out of respect, shake his hand and smile.  Be incredibly dense and show no fear, unless the individual has a gun or other weapon pointed at you.  The object is to drag it out as long as you can until he hopefully gives up.  Unfortunately, this does not always work and it's better to just pay the damn "fee" - with lots of coin.    

    "I called my friend earlier about missing my original flight and he said I should sleep here overnight, and he read me some of the reviews on sleepinginairports.net" -Tetsu

    15. Write us and give us the Lowdown: This is actually THE MOST IMPORTANT thing to do! Share your story with us by letting us know what the airport you camped out at was like. By submitting your experiences, good or bad or just general good to know information, you are helping to keep this site as up to date as possible.  Chances are you'll be thankful for other traveller's reviews the next time you need to know about an airport. 

    16. Have Fun: While there are times when you can't sleep, sleeping in airports is not only extreme budget travel, it is an adventure. Enjoy it! Have fun. Explore your inner homeless person. Most importantly make the most of the situation. The best memories of travel are the experiences you return home with, and trust me, there are quite a few adventures to be had in airports. From someone who has done it to save money or as a result of a layover, let me tell you that it can be fun and it just adds an extra element of strangeness to your trip.

    "I really appreciate the sleeping tips on this site" -fules

    Sweet Dreams!